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INTRODUCTION
Japanese involvement in Malaysia dates back to
the beginning of this century. From the beginning
Japanese interests were predominantly economic in nature
Japan looked upon Malaya as a source of raw materials
and also as a potential market for its finished products
Japan was initially drawn by the rubber industry which
became lucrative in 1910 and the iron ore mines which
were essential for its steel industries.^ In 1928 iron
ore imports from Malaya accounted for 40 percent of
2Japan's total consumption. Japanese cotton goods and 
other manufactures were low priced and therefore popular 
in Malaysia. However Japanese efforts to make in-roads 
on the Malaysian economy were impeded by the British 
colonial administration. For example, the British 
enacted a Rubber Restriction Act in 1917 which limited 
rubber exports to Japan. The British also introduced a 
quota system on Japanese manufactured imports in the 
late 1930s.
In 1936 Japan's official policy was to develop 
economic resources in the South Seas (Nanyo) and this 
policy eventually led to the 'Greater East Co­
prosperity Sphere' scheme whereby Japan pursued economic 
interests through militarism. During the Second World 
War Japan established itself as a formidable Pacific 
Power and within a short space of time occupied most of 
the Southeast Asian countries, Malaya included. The
Japanese occupied Malaya for three years and these years 
are remembered with bitterness because of the brutality 
of the Japanese occupation forces. At the end of the 
Second World War Japan emerged a defeated power with a 
shattered economy. Japan's priority in the postwar 
period was economic reconstruction. This process 
required that Japan maintain its trading ties with 
natural resource rich countries like Malaysia.
Towards the late 1950s Japan began cautiously 
to expand its economic relations with Malaysia, starting 
first with investment. The Japanese were encouraged 
by the Malaysian attitude towards foreign investment and 
the flow of investment gradually increased. Currently 
Japan is a major source of foreign investment for 
Malaysia. Japan's economic development and its emergence 
as a dominant economic power in the region impressed 
Malaysia to the extent that in 1982 the government 
launched the 'Look East' policy with the explicit 
objective of emulating Japanese work practices and 
ethics. When introducing the policy in 1982, the Prime 
Minister said,
"I have been exhorting Malaysians to emulate 
the Japanese, particularly in work ethics 
and ethical values. We have come to 
realize that the basis of your rapid 
development is your sense of commitment 
and your continued willingness to work.
Thus when we ask Malaysians to Look East, 
it is not so much your living standards .... 
what we are interested is your ethics"^
2
There is a general expectation in Malaysia
that the emulated must help the emulator achieve his 
5goals. The Prime Minister himself believes that Japan 
at least has some responsibility to help. He stated:
"As a major world economic power, Japan, 
no doubt feels a certain sense of obligation 
to the rest of the world, especially to 
developing countries like Malaysia."
The Prime Minister also hoped that the Look 
East policy will result in closer economic cooperation 
between Malaysia and Japan. Closer economic ties will 
not only affect the economic relations between Malaysia 
and Japan but it will also effect the other components 
of bilateral ties between the two countries. Closer 
economic relations will result in closer political and 
military links between Malaysia and Japan because there 
exists a strong inter-relation between these three 
components of bilateral relations. The focus of this 
dissertation will be to analyse the economic, political 
and military aspects of the bilateral relations between 
Malaysia and Japan with a view to ascertaining whether 
closer ties with Japan will benefit Malaysia.
The economic relationship between Malaysia 
and Japan is said to be typical of the relationship 
between a developing and developed country. In such a 
relationship unequal economic strength is manifested 
by the stronger partner's preponderance in determining 
the pattern of bilateral trade and dictating the terms
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of investment and technological transfer. To what 
extent this applies to the economic ties between 
Malaysia and Japan will determine if closer economic 
relations is likely to benefit Malaysia. This requires 
an analysis of the features of the various components 
of the bilateral economic relations between Malaysia 
and Japan namely trade, investment and technology 
transfer; and an evaluation of the impact of the 
bilateral economic relations in the context of Malaysia's
economic objectives and aspirations. These aspects
»
are discussed in chapter one.
Chapter two will focus on the political 
relationship between Malaysia and Japan. Unlike its 
economic image, Japan projects a low political profile. 
Japan's political involvement in Southeast Asia was 
motivated by its enormous economic stake in the region. 
Therefore Japan's political concern is the peace and 
stability of this region. Malaysia, situated in 
Southeast Asia, has a similar interest. To what extent 
Japan's political activities in the region complement 
Malaysia efforts individually and through Asean to 
ensure political stability in the region is a yardstick 
to determine if closer political ties between these two 
countries should be encouraged. In order to assess the 
political ties between Malaysia and Japan, the 
perception and involvement of these two countries on 
some selected political issues, related to the stability
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of the Southeast Asian region, will be analysed.
Malaysia is situated in Southeast Asia, a 
region of strategic importance to Japan because of it's 
economic stake in the region and also because of the 
sea lanes of communication through the Straits of 
Malacca and South China Sea which is often described 
as Japan's 'lifeline'. In the past Japan was a major 
military power in the region currently Japan does not 
have a military role in the region. In addition, it 
has also pledged never to become a major military power 
in the region. Nevertheless Japan currently has the 
eighth largest military build-up in the world. 
Furthermore it also has a large capacity to further 
develop its military capacity should it desire so.
In view of these facts, it is necessary to review 
Japan's defence posture in the region in order to 
determine how Malaysia and other Asean member states 
should handle this aspect of their bilateral relations 
with Japan to ensure the stability and security of this 
region. The strategic component of bilateral relations 
is discussed in chapter three.
The concluding chapter will attempt to 
establish if closer bilateral relationship between 
Malaysia and Japan is advantageous to Malaysia as a 
sovereign political entity.
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CHAPTER ONE
MALAYSIA - JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
1. Introduction
Economic relations between Malaysia and Japan 
began at the turn of the century. The establishment of 
economic ties between the two countries was to a large 
extent the result of the complimentary nature of the 
two economies. Malaysia, richly endowed with natural 
resources, was initially valued for its rubber and iron 
ores. Likewise Malaysia provided a potential market for 
the Japanese cotton industry. Strong economic ties, 
however, were hindered by the colonial status of 
Malaysia which fostered closer economic ties with 
United Kingdom in particular and the British Commonwealth 
in general.
On gaining independence in 1957, Malaysia 
embarked on an ambitious development programme. Japan, 
unsuccessful in its attempt to establish the 'Greater 
East Co-prosperity Sphere', was left defeated and 
devastated by the war. In the immediate post war period 
Japan concentrated all its efforts and resources towards 
rebuilding its economy and industries. The success 
of this formidable task, often described as the 
'Japanese Miracle', enabled Japan to emerge as the 
dominant economic power in the region.
7
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This chapter focuses on the economic relations 
between Malaysia and Japan. In order to place the 
discussion in its proper perspective it is necessary 
to identify the economic priorities of Malaysia and 
the major structural changes in the Malaysian economy. 
This will provide the framework for evaluating the 
various components of the economic relations between 
Malaysia and Japan.
2. The Malaysian Economy : An Overview
At the time of independence, Malaysia was 
basically a primary commodity producer and was largely 
dependent on two primary products namely rubber and 
tin.'*' The government was conscious of the need to 
develop and expand the country's economic base in order 
to accelarate economic development and to attain economic 
stability. With these objectives in mind it embarked 
on a strategy of diversification. The diversification 
process took two forms. First, there was diversification 
within the primary commodities sector. In addition to 
rubber, other cash crops were cultivated. These 
included oil palm, pepper, cocoa and pineapples. The 
extensive exploitation of mineral fuel deposits resulted 
in the expansion of the mining sector. The 
diversification strategy did result in the expansion of 
Malaysia's economic base but failed to overcome the 
problem of instability and fluctuations in export 
earnings. This was among the reasons that led to the
8
second form of diversification namely industrialization.
The second form of diversification was by 
industrialization. In the initial stages Malaysia's 
industrialization policy was confined to import 
substitution. This involved developing the light 
manufacturing industries namely the consumer product 
manufacturing sector. This process was completed 
within a decade and in the 1970s Malaysia launched an 
export-led industrialization programme. The 
manufacturing sector and the resource based industries 
were identified as having potential for export expansion. 
Toward the end of the 1970s Malaysia embarked on heavy 
industrialization as part of its ongoing diversification 
strategy. It set up the Heavy Industries Corp (Hicom) 
to coordinate its projects which included a sponge iron 
and steel billet plant, cement plant, auto body 
stamping and the 'National Car' industry.
The process of industrialization requires 
large volume of investment which cannot be generated 
domestically. To overcome this shortage, the government 
has been vigorously promoting foreign investment.
The government has offered various forms of incentives.
In 1968 it introduced the Investment Incentive Act.2 
The incentives provided by the Act were designed to 
induce a greater and more rapid flow of investment into 
the manufacturing industries, certain commercial 
enterprises and into the expansion of exports of 
manufactured products. In 1974 the Investment Incentive
9
Act was amended and a more liberal set of incentives
were offered. In addition to enhancing the development
of the industrial sector, the incentives were also
aimed at other objectives. For example, the Locational 
3Incentive was intended to enhance the development of 
less developed states in order to attain more balanced 
regional development. The Export Allowance Scheme^ 
was intended to expand Malaysia's export capacity which 
is expected to contribute towards attaining a more 
favourable balance of payment.
In addition to incentives for foreign 
investment, the government has also placed emphasis on 
Manpower development to attain its industrialization 
objective. Instead of encouraging expansion of academic 
education, especially at the tertiary level, greater 
emphasis is now accorded on training labour with skills 
required by the industrial sector.5 Cooperation between 
training institutions and the private sector is 
encouraged because it is a more relevant and cost 
effective means to train unskilled labour. The 'Look 
East' policy which primarily involves the emulation 
of suitable work practices and ethics is intended to 
hasten the process of human resource development.
The government has also placed great significance on 
Research and Development (R & D). It has identified 
this as an important area that needs to be developed 
because of the importance of R & D to productivity and 
the development of a strong industrial base. The
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emphasis accorded to R & D is expected to enhance the 
technological capacity of the country.
Protection of the country's Balance of 
Payment continues to remain a major objective of the 
Malaysian government. A deficit and especially a 
persistent deficit in the country's Balance of Payments 
is clearly detrimental to Malaysia's long term growth 
prospects. A foreign exchange gap could result in a 
trade restricted growth which implies that the targetted 
growth rate will not be achieved. Consequently it is 
only reasonable to expect Malaysia to strive to achieve 
a favourable Balance of Payments. The steps the 
government is pursuing to attain a more favourable 
Balance of Payment include import substitution, export- 
led industrialization and vigorous export promotion 
activities. Likewise the government is also committed 
to reversing the growing deficits in the invisible or 
'services' account.
National unity is another important objective 
of the government. Malaysia's strategy for this 
objective is set out in the two-pronged New Economic 
Policy which was launched in the wake of the 1969 racial 
riots. The two objectives are eradication of poverty 
irrespective of race and restructuring of society to 
eliminate the identification of race with economic
ofunction and geographical location.
The strategy for poverty redressal includes 
efforts to raise the involvement of the 'rural poor'
11
in the mainstream of economic life via new land 
development schemes, new agricultural projects and the 
absorption of the rural labour force into higher income 
jobs in the industrial and service sectors. There are 
also efforts to improve the quality of life through the 
provision of adequate public services. The strategy 
for restructuring of society involves efforts to reduce 
income imbalances among ethnic groups and regions via 
restructuring of employment patterns and ownership of 
share capital in the corporate sector and the creation 
of a Bumiputra Commercial and Industrial community.
Over the three decades since independence 
there have been some very important changes in the 
structure of the Malaysian economy. By far the most 
important change in the Malaysian economy is the 
relative decline of the agricultural sector and the 
growing importance of the manufacturing sector. The 
share of agriculture in GDP was 29.1 per cent in 1972 
but declined to 21.3 per cent in 1986 (Table 1.1).
In 1986 the manufacturing sector contributed 20 per cent 
of GDP. In contrast in' 1972 the manufacturing sector 
was only responsible for 16.1 per cent of GDP. Similarly 
the mining sector accounted for 6.2 per cent in 1972 
and 11.1 per cent in 1986. The increase in the 
contribution of the mining sector is the result of the 
extensive exploitation of mineral fuel and Liquified 
Natural Gas (LNG).
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TABLE 1.1
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN
Per cent of GDP
1972 1986
Agriculture, livestock, 
forestry & fishing 27.7 21.3
Mining and quarrying 4.6 11.1
Manufacturing 16.1 20.0
Services^* 28.4 28.6
Others^ 21.9 19.0
Total 100.0 100.0
1 - includes gas, electricity and water; transport,
storage and communications; wholesale and retail 
trade, hotels and restaurants; Finance, insurance, 
real estate and business services.
2 - includes construction, Government services and
other services.
Source: Economic Report, Ministry of Finance Malaysia
(Various issues).
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3. Trade Relations
Trade relations can be analysed by considering 
Visible trade and Invisible trade separately. Visible 
trade is concerned with trade in goods between countries. 
The primary focus is on the flow of merchandise exports 
and imports. Invisible trade, on the other hand, is 
concerned with trade in services between countries.
The common 'services' traded include shipping, air 
transportation, insurance and managerial and 
technological expertise. Invisible trade also includes 
inflow and outflow of capital. Malaysia, in common 
with other developing countries, has a very large 
proportion of its international trade in the form of 
Visible trade.
3.1 Visible Trade
Malaysia has an open economy and is heavily 
dependent on visible trade. This is evident from the 
importance of exports and imports in the country's 
national income (GNP). Over the last two and a half 
decades, exports and imports averaged about 40 - 50 
per cent of the country's national income (Table 1.2). 
Clearly despite the priority accorded to import 
substitution Malaysia's dependence on international 
trade remains very high and, as in the past, the growth 
of the Malaysian economy will depend substantially on 
the growth of the country's external trade sector.
14
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TABLE 1.2
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE TO THE MALAYSIA ECONOMY
M$ mil
aExports
(E)
. bImports
(M)
Trade Balance 
(E-M)
cGNP
Y
E/Y M/Y
1960 3,632.6 2,786.4 846.2 6,649 0.55 0.42
1965 3,782.5 3,356.1 426.4 8,776 0.43 0.38
1970 5,162.4 4,232.3 839.1 11,734 0.44 0.36
1975 9,231.1 8,530.4 700.5 21,605 0.43 0.40
1980 28,171.6 23,451.0 4,720.6 51,718 0.38 0.45
1985 38,327.3 30,557.6 7,769.7 71,808 0.53 0.43
a - Exports in Fob prices 
b - Imports in Cif prices 
c - GNP valued at market price
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia
Quarterly Economic Bulletin - Various issues.
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TABLE 1.3
MALAYSIA : DIRECTION OF TRADE
per cent
Countries 1970 1974 1980 1984 1985
Imports from
USA 0.6 9.9 15.0 16.4 15.2
EEC 24.9 21.0 15.4 13.5 14.2
Japan 17.5 22.3 22.9 26.2 30.5
Singapore 7.5 8.3 11.7 13.1 15.7
Rest of Asean 8.5 6.3 4.9 6.4 6.5
Rest of World 40.0 31.9 30.2 24.4 17.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Exports to
USA 13.0 14.0 16.3 13.5 12.9
EEC 20.0 21.2 16.7 12.6 14.0
Japan 18.3 19.6 22.8 22.3 18.4
Singapore 21.6 21.6 19.1 20.5 19.3
Rest of Asean 3.2 2.3 3.2 6.2 6.4
Rest of World 25.9 24.0 21.5 24.8 29.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Economic
(Various
Report, 
issues)
Ministry of Finance Malaysia
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Additionally, and as was suggested earlier, export-led 
industrialization is likely to enhance Malaysia's trade 
dependence.
The direction of Malaysia's trade is 
summarised in Table 1.3 above. The four countries/ 
country groupings with which Malaysia has the largest 
flow of visible trade are the United States, the 
European Economic Community (EEC) , Japan and Singapore. 
In 1970 the EEC was Malaysia's major source of imports 
largely on account of Malaysia's colonial ties with 
Britain. But by 1974 Japan replaced the EEC as the 
major source of Malaysia's imports accounting for 22.3 
per cent of its total imports. In the case of exports, 
Japan emerged as Malaysia's largest export market in 
1976, accounting for 22.8 per cent of its total exports. 
Currently Japan is the second largest export market for 
Malaysia (after Singapore) and is by far the most 
important source of Malaysia imports accounting, for
Qexample, for twice the share of imports from EEC.
Taking both exports and imports Japan emerges as 
Malaysia's most important trading partner.
Table 1.4 shows the direction of Japan's 
trade. Evidently, Malaysia is an insignificant trading 
partner of Japan. Japan's imports from Malaysia ranged 
between 1.6 per cent to 3.3 per cent of total Japanese 
imports between 1970 and 1985. For the same period 
Japan's exports to Malaysia has never exceeded 2 per 
cent of total Japanese exports. Also of some importance
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TABLE 1.4
JAPAN : DIRECTION OF TRADE
per cent
Country 1970 1974 1980 1984 1985
Import from
USA 29.4 20.4 17.4 19.2 19.9
EEC 5.9 6.4 5.6 6.7 6.9
Aust & N.Zealand 8.8 7.1 5.6 4.6 6.4
SEA 13.7 18.5 20.1 19.7 20.0
Malaysia 2.2 1.6 2.5 3.2 3.3
Middle East 12.4 25.6 31.7 23.7 23.1
Latin America 7.3 4.4 4.1 5.2 4.8
Communist Bloc 4.7 5.1 4.7 5.7 6.5
Rest of World 15.5 10.9 8.4 12.0 8.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Export to
USA 30.7 23.0 24.2 35.2 37.2
EEC 6.7 10.7 12.8 11.4 11.4
Aust & N.Zealand 3.6 4.5 3.1 3.7 3.7
S.E.A. 24.5 21.6 22.2 19.9 17.7
Malaysia 0.6 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.2
Middle East 3.3 6.6 11.1 8.3 6.9
Latin America 6.1 9.1 6.9 5.0 4.8
Communist Bloc 5.4 7.1 7.0 6.2 7.1
Rest of World 18.6 16.1 11.1 8.4 10.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Economic Statistic Annual 1985 Vol. 60
Research and Statistic Dept., The Bank of Japan.
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is the fact that the relative importance of Malaysia as 
a market for Japanese exports had declined in the 1980s. 
Overall it would appear that the trade relationship 
between Japan and Malaysia is asymmetrical. Malaysia 
is heavily dependent on Japan both as a market and as a 
source of imports, while to Japan, Malaysia is a minor 
trading partner. Tentatively it is possible that the 
importance accorded by Malaysia to its visible trade 
relations with Japan and the expectations of Malaysia 
from this relationship are unlikely to be reciprocated 
by Japan.
Implicit in Japan's emergence as Malaysia's 
main trading partner is the enormous growth in bilateral 
trade between the two countries. Over the period 1972- 
1984 exports to Japan rose at an average annual rate of 
18.8 per cent per annum. Likewise Malaysia's import 
from Japan grew at 17.5 per cent per year.^ These 
contrast with Malaysia's total imports growth rate of 
16.3 per cent.'*"'*' Consequently not only is Japan, the 
most important trading partner of Malaysia, it is likely 
to remain so for the foreseeable future.
Having established the importance of Japan to 
Malaysia as a trading partner, it is useful to analyse 
two aspects of the Visible trade relations between 
Malaysia and Japan, namely the trade balance and the 
commodity composition. Malaysia's Visible trade balance 
with Japan is presented in Table 1.5. Malaysia's trade 
balance with Japan was favourable in only five of the
19
TABLE 1.5
MALAYSIA'S VISIBLE TRADE BALANCE WITH JAPAN
M$ mil
Year Imports Exports Total Trade Balance
of
Trade
Balance of
Trade
excluding
Crude
Petroleum
1972 942.3 832.4 1,774.7 -109.9 -256.6
1973 1,347.5 1,336.4 2,683.9 - 11.9 -150.0
1974 2 ,200.6 1,717.6 3,918.2 -483.0 -679.4
1975 1,708.0 1,326.2 3,034.2 -381.8 -713.4
1976 2,062.4 2,835.2 4,897.6 +772.8 - 40.9
1977 2,615.9 3,061.0 5,676.9 +445.9 -503.4
1978 3,169.0 3,703.0 6,872.0 +534.0 -639.0
1979 3,840.3 5,668.2 9,508.5 +1,827.9 rH i—11
1980 5,368.3 6,429.3 11,797.6 +881.0 -1,804.6
1981 6,516.0 5,727.6 12,243.6 -788.4 -3,389.7
1982 7,253.1 5,726.3 12 ,979.4 -1,526.8 -3,658.2
1983 7,768.7 6,429.2 14,197.9 -1,339.5 -4,605.2
1984 8,646.0 8,629.0 17,275.0 -16.5 N. A.
1972-
1984 53,4381. 53,421.4 106,859.5 -196.2 -16,481.50
Sources: 1972-1983, as cited by Dr. Lin See Yan, Mac 1984.
1984, Bank Negara Economic Bulletin 1986.
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thirteen years. The overall Visible trade balance 
between Malaysia and Japan between 1972 and 1984 
recorded a deficit of M$ 196.2 million. Malaysia's 
Visible trade balance with Japan is worse than is 
presented in column 4 of Table 1.5. The rapid growth 
of petroleum exports has concealed the true position of 
Malaysia's trade balance with Japan. The exclusion of 
petroleum from Malaysia's exports to Japan reveals a 
very unfavourable Visible trade balance with Japan 
(column 5, Table 1.5). The exclusion of petroleum 
exports indicate that Malaysia has posted a deficit in 
the Visible trade balance each year. Of equal 
importance is the fact that the deficits are on an 
upward trend. Because crude petroleum is a depleting 
resource and also because crude petroleum prices are 
volatile, in the long run there is a significant 
tendency for an unfavourable trade balance with Japan. 
And because Japan is Malaysia's major trading partner, 
the trade balance with Japan will have a significant 
impact on the position of the Malaysian Balance of 
Payment. The outcome of visible trade between Malaysia 
and Japan is clearly in conflict with Malaysia's 
objective of maintaining a surplus in the country's 
balance of payment.
The second aspect of Visible trade relations 
between Malaysia and Japan is the commodity composition 
of trade. It has been established earlier that one of 
Malaysia's principle economic objective is export led
21
industrialization. The industrialization process has
resulted in the manufacturing sector becoming the major
industrial activity and in 1985 it accounted for 13 per
12cent of the GNP. The share of manufactured exports in 
Malaysia's total exports registered an increase for the 
period from 1970 to 1983 (Table 1.6). Manufactured 
exports accounted for 26.1 per cent of Malaysia's exports 
in 1970 and 30.2 per cent in 1983. In the light of 
Japan's importance as a trading partner the success of 
an export-led industrialization strategy would depend, 
to an important extent, on Malaysia exporting a 
significant amount of manufactured goods to Japan.
The detailed commodity composition of Malaysia's exports 
by country is not obtainable. But what little evidence 
that is available suggests that Japan does not constitute 
an important market for Malaysian manufactured exports.
TABLE 1.6
MALAYSIA : % OF MANUFACTURING GOODS IN TOTAL EXPORTS
per cent
Exports to: 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
Japan 26.1 30.7 21.4 15.0 15.7
USA 68.4 61.4 52.2 44.4 76.6
EEC 18.8 25.1 34.9 42.5 48.3
World 28.1 26.1 30.4 27.8 30.2
Source: AIDXT, cited by Tsuneo Nakauchi (Mac 1987).
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The market share of Malaysia's manufactured exports to
its major trading partner is presented in Table 1.6.
While Malaysia's manufactured exports to some of its
trading partners, namely the USA and EEC increased
during the period from 1970 to 1983, its manufactured
exports to Japan actually fell substantially from 30.7
per cent in 1970 to about 15.7 per cent of total exports
13to Japan in 1983. Of greater significance is the
fact that export of manufactured products to Japan also
decreased in absolute terms. The export of manufactures
were valued M$ 752 million in 1980 and M$ 488 million 
14in 1982. Obviously Malaysia's exports to Japan does 
not reflect the structural changes in the economy.
Instead if reflects a pattern that is in conflict with 
Malaysia's diversification strategy and industrial 
programme.
Malaysia remains committed to an export 
promotion philosophy but Japanese policies do not always 
facilitate the realization of Malaysia's aim. The 
major hinderance to Malaysia's effort to diversify and 
increase the volume of its exports to Japan is 
protectionism. While Japanese products have comparatively 
easy access to the Malaysian market. Japan has resorted 
to protectionist devices to maintain a strict control 
over access into its market. Japan's intentions are 
to protect its less competitive and inefficient 
industries from foreign competition. The common 
practice is to impose various forms of tariff and non-
23
tariff barriers on imports. With regard to Malaysia, 
barriers erected by Japan are as follows:
(1) The existing tariff structure in Japan favours
the import of raw material rather than
processed or finished products. In the case
of sawn logs and sawn timber, for example,
tariffs range from 0 to about 10 per cent,
while.duty on plywood ranges between 15 per
15cent to about 20 per cent. Thus although
Japan has always imported more than 54 per
cent of Malaysian sawn log (at times as much
as 60 per cent) Japan's share of Malaysian
sawn timber exports is seldom more than 3 per 
16cent. In the case of other down stream 
wood products the situation is not very 
disimilar. Such a differential tariff policy 
not only discourages Malaysian exports of 
manufactured wood products, it also undermines 
Malaysia's resource base industrialization 
policy. In addition import duties imposed 
by Japan tend to be higher than those imposed 
by other developed countries. For example 
the import duties imposed by Japan on garments 
ranges between 14-17 per cent where else other
OECD members impose a much lower import
. . 17duty.
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(2) Non-tariff barriers in the form of stringent 
import regulations and other specifications 
are imposed to restrict the entry of 
manufactured goods into the Japanese market.
For example, in addition to health and 
sanitary regulations producers of food products 
must also satisfy certain requirements 
pertaining to the percentage of various 
ingredients used in the production of the 
food products.^
*
(3) Malaysian exporters have to rely on the
Japanese Sogoshosha's distribution channels 
for marketing their products in Japan.
The monopolistic distribution system prevents 
the Malaysian manufacturer from conducting 
market research, inter alia, to determine the
important components of demand of the
t 19Japanese consumer.
Malaysia and its Asean counterparts have
frequently voiced their dissatisfaction and frustrations
20toward Japan's protectionist policies. The concessions
made in response to such criticisms have often been
21marginal and ineffective. The concessions are merely 
symbolic in nature because for most products the value 
of tariff cuts are not very significant, and also the 
concessions are given on a very limited range of sample 
of items and often major export items are not exempted
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from the tariff'concession. The Generalised System of 
Preference (GSP) scheme excludes a large number of 
Malaysia's major exports such as canned pineapples, 
coconut oil, plywood of tropical hardwood, fish and 
palm oil kernel. Furthermore the GSP is generally not 
effective because the scheme has a safeguard mechanism 
in the form of quotas and ceilings beyond which the GSP 
is either inoperative or insignificant. Japan took a 
major step to liberalize its trade policies in 1983, 
when the existing ceiling on imports of manufactured 
goods produced by developing countries was raised from 
7.6 billion to $11.5 billion. ^  Cl'early this is a 
general concession and does not apply to Malaysia or its 
Asean partners per se. While this concession certainly 
provides an opportunity for Malaysia to increase its 
manufactured exports to Japan, the extent to which 
Malaysia is likely to benefit from this concession is 
dependent upon the outcome of competition between 
Malaysia and other developing countries to exploit the 
increase in the ceiling.
In quantitative and qualitative terms, the 
Visible trade between Malaysia and Japan is less 
beneficial to Malaysia. The trade balance is by and 
large in Japan's favour and can thus constitute a 
hinderance to Malaysia's long term objectives. In 
quantitative terms, Malaysia's exports to Japan continue 
to be dominated by primary commodities. Consequently 
Malaysia's trade with Japan does not facilitate export-
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led industrialization of this country. There is thus 
a conflict of interest between Malaysia and Japan.
While Malaysia's objective is to increase manufactured 
exports it would seem that it is in Japan's interest to 
prevent this from happening. Given the opposing interests, 
a major change in the existing pattern of Visible trade 
between Malaysia and Japan is not likely. Moreover 
because from Japan's point of view Malaysia is an 
unimportant trading partner, Malaysia's ability to 
influence Japanese trade policies is likely to be 
minimal.
3.2 Invisible Trade
The trade in Invisibles between Malaysia and
Japan is much smaller than merchandise trade between the
two countries. Nevertheless a persistent trend of a
large and growing deficit in the Invisible account has
raised concern in Malaysia. The deficits in the Invisible
trade account between Malaysia and Japan quadrupled
from M$ 503 million in 1979 to M$ 2,177 million in 
231985. This is an enormous increase over a period of
4 years. The major components of the Invisible trade 
account are 'Freight and Insurance', Other transportation, 
travel, Investment income, government transactions and 
other services. There are several factors related to 
each of these components that explain the growing 
deficit in the Invisible account.
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To a large extent, the deficit in the freight
and insurance component is a result of Japan's trading
policy which involves buying in Fob prices and selling
in Cif prices. This implies that the freight and
insurance component of the trade between Malaysia and
Japan is handled by Japanese shipping and insurance
companies. Consequently there is a negative 'Freight
and Insurance' element in the Malaysian balance of 
24payment. But the dominance of Japanese shipping and
insurance companies in the trade between the two
countries alone cannot explain the size and rapid
increase in the deficit on the 'freight and insurance'
component. Clearly Japanese shipping and insurance
companies are serving a much larger portion of Malaysia's
25external trade than merely their bilateral trade.
Another factor which contributes to the
increasing deficit is Japan's practice of switching
currencies of settlement by which imports and exports
are paid for. In 1980 Malaysian exporters lost an
equivalent of about M$ 554 million simply because they
were unable to denominate Malaysian exports in Yen which
2 6was then appreciating in value. This discriminating 
practice enables Japan to take advantage of the 
fluctuations in the exchange rates.
Payment on Investment income is a significant 
component to Malaysia-Japan trade in Invisibles because 
Japan is a major source of foreign investment for 
Malaysia. Investment income basically consists of funds
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flowing out of Malaysia in the form of profits, 
dividends and interests. Investment income payments to 
Japan increased progressively from M$ 165 million in 
1981 to M$ 230 million in 1983 (see Table 1.7).
TABLE 1.7
M$ million
Year Payment on 
Investment Income
Contract and 
professional 
charges
1981 165 165
1982 198 326
1983 230 477
Source: Lin See Yan, 'Malaysia-Japan Trade Remsted',
Mac 1984.
Within the broad category of 'other services' 
there are several items which account for substantial 
outflow of funds from Malaysia to Japan. These include 
payment for professional and technical services in the 
field of exploration and production of oil; and the 
construction sector. Contract and professional charges 
paid to Japan increased from M$ 165 million in 1981 to 
M$ 477 million in 1983 (Table 1.7). Finally the 'travel' 
component also records a continuous deficit vis-a-vis 
Japan. The deficit increased from M$ 0.3 million in 
1981 to about M$ 50 million in 1983.^
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The size and the increasing trend of deficits 
in the Invisible trade indicates that this trade is a 
matter of concern to Malaysia. In the case of most 
items, the deficits are either too small or an inevitable 
outcome of policies of the Malaysian government.
Payment for contract and professional charges by Malaysia 
to Japan is, for example, an outflow arising from the 
decision of the Malaysian government to award a number 
of large infrastructure projects to Japanese companies. 
Such payments are thus the result of policies related to
ft
Malaysia's 'Look East' policy (which is discussed in the
latter part of the chapter). On three components,
however, the deficits are sufficiently large to prompt
Malaysia to rectify the situation. These are payment
for 'Investment income', 'Freight and Insurance' and
'travel'. Moreover these 3 components of the Invisible
trade between the two countries are amendable to
manipulation by Malaysia.
On the question of 'Freight and Insurance',
the Malaysian government has adopted two strategies to
reduce the deficits. The first strategy concentrates
2 8on expanding and improving the shipping industry.
The government has provided a number of incentives to
encourage the growth and expansion of the shipping
2 9industry in Malaysia. But for several reasons such 
as: the global over capacity in the industry;
traditional practices and links, Japanese overpresence 
with its efficient shipping and competitive freight
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rates, Malaysia has had little success in reducing its 
dependence on foreign shipping services. This is 
evident from the continuous escalation in the 'Freight 
and Insurance' component of the Balance of Payment of 
Malaysia. The second strategy adopted by Malaysia to 
reduce the deficits on 'Freight and Insurance' was to 
encourage its traders to adopt a policy of selling Cif 
and buying Fob. But Malaysia has had little success in 
this endeavour because it is not economical for Malaysian 
traders who trade in small lots to sell Cif and buy Fob. 
In any event deficits on the 'Freight and Insurance' 
element will continue because the solutions to rectify 
it will take a long time to take effect.
The second component of the Invisible trade is 
payment on Investment income which is closely related to 
Japanese direct investment activities and other forms of 
capital fund such as loans from Japan to Malaysia.
These funds are a major and significant input for 
development and hence will continuously be encouraged by 
Malaysia. Therefore it is very unlikely that the deficit 
in this component will be reversed in the short run.
In order to stamp the outflow, the Malaysian government 
has encouraged reinvestment of profits and dividends.
The fact that the outflow of fund in the form of 
dividends and profits is growing seem to indicate that 
there has been very little positive response from the 
Japanese.
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The third component is 'travel'. There is a
relatively greater prospect for reduction on this outflow.
The Malaysian government can make a contribution towards
reducing deficits in the 'travel' component.^ There is
already some evidence that the deficits need not remain
a permanent feature of the Malaysia-Japan bilateral
relations. Data compiled by the Japan National Travel
Organization showed that the total number of Japanese
travellers visiting Malaysia increased from 78,000 in
1980 to about 90,700 in 1983. It was calculated that
the average increase works out to be about 4.9 per cent 
32.per annum. Also another study by the Malaysian
Tourist Development Cooperation observed that 58.4 per
cent of Japanese travelling to Malaysia were repeat 
33visitors. Hence if the tourist industry can be 
developed in Malaysia and if the large potential 
Japanese market can be drawn to the country, foreign 
exchange losses and deficits in the travel component can 
be reduced. In the long run there is no reason why a 
well developed tourist industry and an efficient 
marketing programme in Japan cannot allow Malaysia to 
even record a surplus from the travel component.
Overall the trade relations between Malaysia 
and Japan were initially pursued because of the 
complementary nature of the two economies. The 
complementary relationship is being replaced by an 
increasingly competitive relationship as Malaysia pursues 
its industrialization and development goals. There are
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now differing and opposing interests as the two countries 
pursue this bilateral trade relationship. Japan being 
economically stronger, has been able to obtain more 
benefits from the trade relationship because it is able 
to impose its trading practices and policies such as 
buying Fob and selling Cif, quotas on import and 
protectionist policies that restrict access to its 
market. Malaysia, with the weaker economy, is the 
subordinate trade partner. Being the weaker party in 
the trade relations Malaysia is unable to significantly 
alter the structure of bilateral relations with Japan to 
correspond to its economic objectives. Consequently 
attempts to resolve problems related to trade with Japan 
are seldom on a bilateral basis and are usually attempted 
via Asean. Furthermore Japanese trade policies and 
practices are determined by its global trade relationship, 
especially its relations with major trading partners 
namely the United States and the EEC. Malaysia is too 
insignificant a trading partner to be able to influence 
Japan's trade policies and practices. Hence it appears 
that the trade relations between Japan and Malaysia is 
a dependent trade relaitonship between a developed and 
a developing economy in which the distribution of 
benefits is likely to favour the developed economy.
Having established that the existing trade relations 
between Malaysia and Japan is asymmetrical, the 
following section will consider whether Japanese 
investment activities in Malaysia tend to reinforce 
this conclusion.
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4 . Investment
Malaysia, recognizing the importance of foreign 
investment for its economic development, encourages 
investment from various sources. The main sources 
include the USA, United Kingdom, Singapore, West Germany, 
Japan and Australia. Japanese investment is significant 
because it always ranks as one of the top three (Table 
1.8) .
TABLE 1.8
MALAYSIA : FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN APPROVED PROJECTS BY COUNTRY AND RANKING
Year Japan W.Germany Australia Hong Kong Singapore Uni ted Kingdom U.S.A.
1978 2 5 7 6 4 3 1
1979 1 6 7 4 3 2 5
1980 2 5 6 7 1 4 3
1981 1 7 2 5 4 6 3
1982 1 5 3 7 6 2 4
1983 3 7 6 2 4 1 5
1984 1 6 7 4 2 5 3
1985 1 . 7 6 4 2 5 3
Source: Economic Report, Ministry of Finance Ma1 aysia (Various Vo 1umes).
34
A change in Japanese foreign policy posture toward
Southeast Asia from non-involvement to active involvement
in the 1950s triggered a rapid growth in Japanese
investment in these countries. The first influx of
Japanese capital into Malaysia occurred in the mid-1950s.
Japan's first postwar investment in Malaysia was a joint
venture in textile set up in 1957. In the late 1950s
and throughout the 1960s Japan, was encouraged by
Malaysia's attitude toward foreign investment but it
nevertheless exercised restraint in its investment
activities. There were still anti-Japanese sentiments
and reparation negotiations were long drawn and settled
only in 1967. Japanese investment in the early stage
was in import substitution such as light manufacturing
and processing activities. The pattern of Japanese
investment was consistent with the incentives granted
by Malaysia as part of its import substitution policy.
Up to 1969 there were only 46 Japanese joint venture
34investments in Malaysia. Japanese investment activities
however increased and expanded in the late 1960s and
1970s. Between 1970 and 1973, 179 new Japanese firms
invested in Malaysia and by 1977 there were 489 firms
3 5with a cumulative capital of US$ 425 million. The 
change in degree of involvement can be explained by 
several 'push' and 'puli' factors.
Malaysia introduced an extensive and attractive 
package of fiscal incentives under the Investment Act of 
1968. The incentives were designed to provide tax relief
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to companies setting up new enterprises or expanding 
existing ones. Generally these incentives took the form 
of awards of pioneer status, labour utilization relief, 
investment tax credits, export incentives, locational 
incentives, and appropriate tariff protection and 
exemption from import duty on raw material and machinery 
required by the manufacturing sector. The Malaysian 
government also provided a variety of physical facilities 
such as 21 industrial estates in various parts of the 
country, 4 Free Trade Zones and also licensed 
manufacturing warehouse facilities. Another pull factor 
which attracted Japanese investment was the fear of 
being excluded from the Malaysian market.
There were several push factors responsible
for the increase in Japanese investment. The oil crises
in the 1970s necessitated an industrial reorganization
in Japan. Up until then Japan relied exclusively on
petroleum as its main source of energy and 100 per cent
of its petroleum requirements were imported. The worst
hit industries were those processing raw material which
were no longer able to maintain international
3 6competitiveness. This forced Japanese industries to 
set up 'off shore' production for primary processing of 
raw materials. Consequently there was increased 
Japanese investment in resource abundant countries in 
Asia and Central and South America. Also the widespread 
concern about high levels of air pollution and the 
associated health hazards forced some industries, such
36
as the steel industries, to be relocated in suitable 
sites abroad.
With the development of industries in Japan
labour became scarce and consequently wage rates
increased in Japan. The average annual wage increase
for the period 1965-1975 was 16 per cent which was
double the average increase of 8 per cent recorded for
37the period 1955-1965. Because the wage increase were
not accompanied by an increase in productivity, the
increase in production costs led to a decline in
competitiveness in overseas markets. This led labour
intensive industries to invest in labour abundant and
low wage countries in Asia and Latin America.
Another contributing factor was the surplus
in the balance of payments. This led the Japanese
government to encourage foreign investment. Foreign
investment was preferred to the revaluation of the Yen.
In 1969 the Japanese government extended automatic
approval for foreign investment for amounts less than
US$ 200,000 and in 1972 completely liberalized foreign 
3 8investment. Other initiatives include the modification
of the special reserve for losses from foreign investment,
the enlargement of the foreign investment insurance
scheme and the increased activities of the Export-Import
3 9Bank in the area of investment finance.
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TABLE 1.9
JAPAN'S DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
US$ mil
1973 1975 1980 1984 1985 1951-1985
Malaysia 126 52 146 142 79 1,125
per cent 3.6 1.6 3.1 1.4 0.6 1.3
Asean 625 856 921 906 935 13,469
per cent 17.9 26.1 19.6 8.9 7.7 16.1
North America 913 905 1,596 3,544 5,495 26,965
per cent 26.2 27.6 34.0 34.9 45.0 32.2
Europe 337 333 579 1,937 1,930 11,002
per cent 9.7 10.2 12.3 19.1 15.8 13.2
China 0 0 12 114 100 287
per cent 0 0 0.3 1.1 0.8 0.3
World 3,491 3,280 4,693 10,155 12,217 83,649
per cent 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Bank of Japan, cited by Tsuneo Nakauchi in 'Asean Way
ahead and Japanese Investment and trade with Asean: 
Mac 1987.
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In absolute terms, the values of Japanese 
investment shows a definite declining trend in the first 
half of 1980s (Table 1.9). In relative terms, that is, 
the proportion of Japanese investment in Malaysia to 
total Japanese overseas investment, a declining trend is 
also evident in the 1970s and in the early 1980s.
Japanese investment in Malaysia in relative terms 
declined from an insignificant 3.0 per cent in 1973 to 
be almost negligible in 1985. On the other hand in the 
same period, an increase, at least in absolute terms was 
recorded for Japan's investment in the advanced 
industrialized countries of Europe and the United States 
(Table 1.9). It appears that Japanese overseas 
investment is not guided by consideration of altrusim.
The following discussion will consider the various 
features of Japanese investment in Malaysia and their 
impact on Malaysia's development priorities discussed 
earlier.
The first characteristic of Japanese investment
in Malaysia is that it takes the form of joint ventures.
This is also the general practice of most other foreign
investors in Malaysia. In the period 1971-1979 a total
of 1577 foreign investment projects were approved by the
government. Out of this total about 126 projects or
8 per cent of the total approved projects were wholly
foreign owned while the remaining 92 per cent or 1451
40projects were joint ventures. Of the 287 Japanese 
projects approved in the same period 12 per cent
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(36 projects) were wholly Japanese owned while the
remaining 88 per cent (253 projects) were joint venture 
41projects. Furthermore not only do Japanese investors 
prefer joint ventures, they also show a preference for 
minority equity participation. For investment up to 
1979, in 60 per cent of Japanese joint ventures,
42Japanese equity participation was less than 50 per cent.
In this respect Japanese investment differs from
investment from other large foreign investors. For
example in 75 per cent of United States' joint ventures
in 1979, United States investors held majority equity 
43participation.
The prevalence of joint ventures as the common 
form of investment in Malaysia can be attributed in part 
to the guidelines of the NEP. The guidelines require 
companies producing for the domestic market to have at 
least 51 per cent Malaysian equity. In this regard, 
Japanese investors' preference for joint ventures and 
their generally minority equity participation is in 
conformity with the NEP requirements. However having 
minority equity participation does not mean that the 
Japanese investors do not have effective control of the 
joint venture. In fact there is no direct relationship 
between equity participation and effective control. 
Effective control instead is achieved by other means 
namely management contracts, technical and licensing 
agreements, trade mark and patent rights and turnkey 
operations. A statistical analysis for the period
40
1970-1979 found that Japanese firms did indeed employ
44all the devices mentioned above. Having effective
control enables the Japanese to determine the various
aspects of the investment, i.e., the location, type of
industry and the choice of production techniques which
is to their interest rather than that of the host
country. For example, Japanese investment is concentrated
in the textile and electronic industries because the
Japanese have demonstrated technological superiority
45over other investors. On the other hand Japanese
»
investment is marginal in export-oriented industries
because these industries threaten 'production at home'
and increase competition in the competitive international
markets. Overall then the possession of effective
control, not withstanding their minority status in a
joint venture, would imply that the nature and character
of Japanese investment in Malaysia would promote Japanese
interests and these need not necessarily coincide with
Malaysia's aims and aspirations.
Another consideration on equity participation
is the target set out in the NEP. Firms are required
to set aside at least 30 per cent of their equity for
Bumiputras. Based on observation of Bumiputra equity
share in the Japanese projects approved between 1980-1982,
there is a discernible trend in recent years towards
46increased Bumiputra equity participation. However 
with regard to the appointment of dealers, Japanese firms 
have yet to achieve the 30 per cent Bumiputra target
41
in the distributive trade.
The second feature of Japanese investment in
Malaysia is that it is concentrated in the manufacturing
sector. In 1980 47.1 per cent of Japanese firms were
involved in manufacturing, 24.6 per cent in trading and
commerce, 9.1 per cent in construction and engineering,
2.1 per cent in mining and the rest in finance, insurance
48and other services. In fact Japan is a major investor 
in the manufacturing sector (Table 1.10). As at December 
1985 Japan accounted for 27.47 per cent of the total 
investment in the manufacturing sector and was only 
1.17 percentage points behind the United Kingdom.
Within the manufacturing sector there is 
another form of concentration. The bulk of the Japanese 
investment is in two main industries, namely textile 
and textile products, and electrical and electronic 
products (Table 1.11).
Other than the manufacturing sector, there is 
also Japanese investment is resource-based industries. 
Among the activities where there is Japanese interest 
are steel mills, tin factories, cement works and sawmills. 
Japanese investment in these industries is part of 
Japan's long term strategy to secure a constant supply 
of natural resources inputs for its industrial needs.
When Malaysia embarked on heavy industrialization 
Japanese investors participated actively in many of the 
major projects. These include the M$ 455 million sponge 
iron and steel billet plant in Trengganu which is a
47
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TABLE I.10
MALAYSIA : FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN COMPANIES IN PRODUCTION 
IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR AS AT 31 ST DECEMBER, 1985
Country Paid-up (M$'000)
Loan 
(M$'000)
Tota 1 
(MS'000)
Percentage
%
F i xed
Assets
(M$'000)
1. S i ngapore 1,263,740 198,105 1,461,845 19.07 1, 126,847
2. Japan 774,584 1,331,713 2,106,297 27.47 1,402,790
3. United Kingdom 720,905 1,475,039 2,195,944 28.64 874,876
4. U.S.A. 287,627 191,671 479,298 6.25 663,774
5. Hong Kong 261,120 1 17,421 378,541 4.94 415,242
6. Ho 11 and 148,160 4,570 152,730 1 .99 528,712
7. W. Germany 112,194 27,086 139,280 1 .82 127,814
8. Austra1ia 104,837 9,335 114,172 1 .49 163,865
9. Switzer1 and 90,536 3,990 94,526 1 .23 202,409
10. Denmark 79,935 6,317 86,252 1.13 39,253
1 1. Arab Countries 34,719 5,439 40,158 0.52 43,581
.12. India 26,300 27,280 53,580 0.70 41,938
13. Canada 25,348 - 25,348 0.33 59,410
14. Taiwan 23,098 31,632 54,730 0.71 29,543
15. France 16,519 16,991 33,510 0.44 20,736
16. Sweden 1 1,016 683 11,699 0.15 18,635
17. Norway 8,361 2,748 11,109 0.15 12,776
18. New Zealand 6,666 - 7,039 0.09 6,254
19. Thai 1 and 3,602 370 3,972 0.05 3,534
20. Korea 3,420 - 3,420 0.05 5,291
21. Brunei 2,414 5,750 8, 164 0. 1 1 1,825
22. Belgium 1 ,933 4,991 6,924 0.09 16,067
23. 1ndonesia 1,751 150 1,901 0.03 2,488
24. Italy 1,591 1,141 2,732 0.04 1,477
25. Bahamas 200 1,500 1,700 0.02 856
26. Phi 1ippines 15 - 15 Neg1igib1e 8
27. Sri Lanka 9 - 9 Neg1igible 1
28. Others 158,831 32,189 191,020 2.49 244,559
29. Unknown 832 832 0.01 1,347
Tota 1 4,170,263 3,496,111 7,666,374 100$ 6,055,908
Source: MIDA
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TABLE I.I I
JAPANESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MALAYSIA AS AT 31 DEC. 1985
Code Sector Paid-up Capital F i xed Asset
M$ mi 1 % M$ mi 1 %
Food Manufacturing 43,778 5.65 53,664 3.8
Textlle & Textile products 215,901 27.9 183,859 13.1
Wood & Wood products 34,322 4.4 22,282 1 .6
Paper, Printing & Publishing 210 0.03 394 0.03
Chemical & Chemical products 18,863 2.4 22,717 1.4
Petroleum & Coal 105,240 13.6 488,744 34.8
Rubber Products 5,482 0.7 9,131 0.6
Plastic Products 14,677 1 .9 18,906 1.3
Non Metalic Mineral Products 38,632 5.0 130,096 9.3
Basic Metal Products 65,126 8.4 83,349 5.9
Fabricated Metal Products 27,091 3.5 26,009 1.8
Machinery Manufacturing 23,377 3.0 25,538 1 .8
Electrical & Electronic Products 1 15,619 14.9 242,718 17.3
Transport Equipment 44,939 5.8 56,880 4.0
Professional Scientific 
and Measuring Equipment 2,000 0.3 3,475 0.2
Mi see 11aneous 7,414 1 .0 14,554 1 .0
Hotel & Tourist Complexs. 1 1 ,913 1.5 20,474 1.5
774,584 100.0 1,402,790 100.0
Source: MIDA, Industrial Promotion Division, Dec. 1986.
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joint venture with a Nippon Steel Corp-led Japanese 
consortium, and the 'Malaysia Car' industry which is a 
joint between Hicom (Heavy Industries Malaysia) and 
Mitsubishi Corp and Mitsubishi Motor Corp.
The growth of the manufacturing sector is to 
a large extent influenced by foreign investment. It was 
pointed out earlier that Japan is one of the major 
investors in the manufacturing sector and therefore has 
the capacity to influence the pattern of development of 
this sector. The concentration of Japanese investment 
in a few industrial activities namely textile and the 
electrical and electronic industry cannot make a 
significant contribution towards the development of a 
broader based manufacturing sector. There is wide scope 
for Japanese investment in other industries that 
currently have marginal Japanese participation.
Japanese participation in the processing of timber, 
rubber and tin is marginal. As at December 1984 Japan 
invested only 0.7 per cent of its total investment in 
the rubber processing industry. Likewise, only 4.4 per 
cent of total Japanese investment was in wood and wood 
product industries (Table 1.11). It would appear that 
the contribution of Japanese investment in Malaysia 
towards resource based industrialization is at best only 
marginal.
The third feature that will be considered is 
the size of Japanese firms. Based on the number of 
employees, Japanese firms are considered to be relatively
45
small. A survey of Japanese firms in Malaysia observed 
that 41 per cent of the firms employed less than 50 
workers each and only 13.4 per cent employed 500 or more 
workers.  ^^
A fourth feature of Japanese firms in Malaysia
is the presence of a large number of expatriates. On
average Japanese firms have the most number of expatriates.
In 1981 there were 904 foreign joint venture manufacturing
companies in Malaysia which employed a total of 1914 
50expatriates. Out of this total there were 166 Japanese
* 51firms which had 476 Japanese expatriates. It was
calculated that on the average Japanese joint ventures
have the highest number of expatriates with a ratio of
4.1 expatriates per company compared to a national
52average of 2.02 expatriate per foreign company.
The third and fourth feature mentioned above 
determines the employment creating capacity of Japanese 
foreign investment in Malaysia. Malaysia has an 
increasing unemployment problem. The unemployment rate 
was about 5 per cent in the late 1970s and is currently 
about 7 per cent. The Malaysian government has provided 
incentives such as the Labour Utilization Relief to 
encourage foreign investors to employ larger numbers of 
local employees. It was ealier pointed out that Japanese 
investments are concentrated in manufacturing activities 
that are relatively labour intensive but the small size 
of Japanese firms restricts the employment creating 
capacity and hence falls short of Malaysia's expectations.
46
Furthermore the continued presence of large numbers of 
expatriates will prolong the transfer of expertise and 
knowledge to local employees.
The fifth feature of Japanese foreign investment 
concerns the location of Japanese firms. Generally most 
of the Japanese firms are located in major towns and in 
the more developed states, namely the Federal Territory, 
Selangor and Penang (Table 1.12). The tendency to 
concentrate in developed areas indicate that infra­
structural facilities and other advantages take precedence 
over locational incentives granted by the government of 
Malaysia. The distribution of Japanese investment has 
an impact on Malaysia's regional development. The 
Malaysian government has placed emphasis on the 
development of the poorer states on the East Coast of 
peninsula Malaysia and the states of Sabah and Sarawak 
in Borneo. The concentration of Japanese investment in 
the more developed states of Malaysia cannot contribute 
toward redressing the regional imbalances prevailing in 
the country. On the contrary, Japanese investment would 
seem to contribute towards unequal regional growth.
Finally, another feature that must be considered 
is the linkage effect of Japan investment. Generally 
linkage effects of Japanese foreign investment are small. 
Japanese firms in Malaysia have not encouraged or 
developed ancillary industries which not only can expand 
the industrial sector but can also increase employment 
creating capacity. Most Japanese joint venture contracts
47
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TABLE 1.12
LOCATION OF JAPANESE FIRMS IN MALAYSIA BY STATE
States No. of Companies %
Federal Territory 87 26.4
Selangor 71 21.6
Penang 45 13.7
Sabah 39 11.9
Johore 24 7.3
Sarawak 18 5.5
Perak 17 5.2
Trengganu 7 2.1
Kedah 5 1.5
Negri Sembilan 4 1.2
Malacca 4 1.2
Pahang 3 0.9
Kelantan 3 0.9
Perlis 1 0.3
Singapore-Based 1 0.3
Total 329 100.0
Source: Saravanamuthu, Johan, 'The Role and Impact
of Japanese Direct Investment in Malaysia' 
May 1983.
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include clauses which tie the firm to purchase all
components from Japan despite the fact that all these
components are locally produced. Often the explanation
offered is that locally produced components are of poorer
quality and more expensive. What research done in the
past would seem to indicate there is very little linkage 
54effect if any. Similarly complaints by local
55manufacturers would seem to reinforce this conclusion.
The absence of linkage effects indicate that Japanese 
investment in Malaysia does not contribute towards a 
broad based integrated development of the manufacturing 
sector of Malaysia.
The discussion in this section has considered 
the major forms of capital flow from Japan to Malaysia. 
Japanese investment in Malaysia again reflects an 
asymmetrical relationship. Japan is a significant 
source of foreign investment for Malaysia while to Japan, 
Malaysia is an insignificant outlet. Japanese investment 
has been a major source of foreign investment for 
Malaysia. In addition the distribution of equity of 
Japanese firms in Malaysia would seem to conform to the 
latter's aspirations particularly the NEP objectives.
But some aspects of Japanese investment in Malaysia 
would appear to be in conflict with Malaysia's objectives. 
First Japanese investments are concentrated in a limited 
range of industries, and their absence in the export- 
oriented resource based industries (excluding petroleum) 
is inconsistent with Malaysia's aim to promote resource
49
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based industrialization. Second the location of 
Japanese investment tends to accentuate the regional 
imbalances in Malaysia and renders the balanced growth 
objectives of the Malaysian government that much more 
difficult to attain. Third, while there is some evidence 
that employment in Japanese firms conform to the NEP 
objectives the overall employment generated is not large 
by virtue of the fact that Japanese firms tend to be 
fairly small in size. Finally the weak linkage effects 
of Japanese investment in Malaysia would suggest that 
they are unlikely to promote the growth of a broad based 
manufacturing sector in Malaysia.
5. Transfer of Technology
Malaysia's indigenous technology is inadequate 
to undertake the task of creating a viable industrial 
sector. Consequently Malaysia is dependent upon imported 
technology which is normally channelled through 
investment activities. Transfer of technology can take 
various forms namely: transfer of design, use of patents,
blue prints, technical literature and technical advice; 
transfer of machinery and equipment including complete 
'turnkey' projects; and the transfer of skills.
Since Malaysia's industrialization strategy in 
the 1980s emphasises heavy and engineering industries, 
the need for technological transfer has become even more 
significant. Japan being a major foreign investor in 
Malaysia is a potential source of technology. It is
50
beyond the scope of this study to ascertain the extent
of technology transfer from Japanese investment in
Malaysia. There are, however, a number of indicators
that suggests that technology transfer by Japanese
investors has been less than satisfactory. First,
Japanese investors have made very little effort to adapt
their technology to Malaysian conditions or to develop
new technologies that would be consistent with conditions 
57in Malaysia. In most cases, Japanese firms introduce 
their production techniques to Malaysia without any 
modifications.
The second major indication of the absence of
technological transfer is the failure of Japanese
investors to establish Research and Development (R & D)
facilities in Malaysia. On the contrary, Japanese
investors are totally dependent on the parent company
in Japan to undertake further development of the product
5 8and production techniques. The absence of R & D 
activities by Japanese firms in Malaysia is to some 
extent attributed to the insufficient technical and 
skilled Malaysian labour that is necessary to sustain 
an extensive R & D programme. Also the choice of 
industries by Japanese investors would limit the scope 
for R & D since the process involved in these industries 
are relatively simple operations. The absence of R & D 
facilities by Japanese investors cannot facilitate the 
process of technological transfer and does not increase 
the capacity to absorb technology by Malaysia.
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The third indication of the absence of
technology is the tendency on the part of Japanese firms
not to employ local personnel in finance, production,
5 9managerial, marketing and purchasing function. Often
the reason given is the lack of trained and skilled
indigenous personnel. This might be overcome by
instituting proper training programmes but training in
Japanese firms is often selective and limited to certain 
6 0type of skill. Also there have been occasions when 
opportunities to train local labour was available but 
were overlooked. ^
Some recent initiatives would seem to imply a 
greater commitment by the Japanese government towards 
technological transfer to the Asean countries. An 'Asean 
Human Resource Development' project was initiated in 
1981 for each Asean state. This project was geared 
towards the needs of the individual states. Another 
project that was launched was the Okinawa International 
Centre which opened in 1985. It is a training centre 
of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
The centre is specifically aimed at providing technical 
training for capable personnel from the Asean countries.
These initiatives not withstanding, Japan's 
contribution to the process of technology transfer has 
not been up to expectations. This would be consistent 
with the general impression that the Japanese are not 
particularly liberal in skill transfers. On the contrary 
joint ventures, managerial contracts, licensing agreements
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and turnkey operations would suggest technological 
control by Japan and Malaysia's technological dependence
6. Look East Policy
The 'Look East' policy was introduced on 
February 8 1982 at the joint annual conference of the 
Malaysia-Japan Economic Association, Majeca and Jameca. 
It is a governmental policy pursued at two levels:
(1) at the level of an external economic policy
Japanese and Korean (and other so defined
'Eastern') governmental and private sector and
technical assistance and training are sought
and contracted by Malaysia. As an extension
of this, students are also to be sent to both
Japan and South Korea for vocational and
6 3tertiary education.
(2) at the level of domestic policy the Malaysian 
government seeks to inculcate the 'Eastern' 
work ethics through various propaganda devices 
and through various policies in the private 
and public sector.^
Malaysia is in the process of industrializing 
and has realized that its indigenous technology is not 
adequate. It is also aware that its labour force is 
largely unskilled. In order to overcome these two 
deficiencies the Prime Minister of Malaysia advocated 
the emulation of Japanese work attitudes, ethics and
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skills. The main thrust of the campaign was first to
promote labour discipline (via propaganda campaign,
company welfarism, in-house unions); second to increase
productivity (via work ethics, higher proportion of
incentives payments); and third to reduce losses (via
6 5quality control circle, 'zero-deficit' groups).
A mechanism to imbibe Japanese work ethics is
via the award of major constructions contracts to
6 6Japanese companies. In addition to the obvious
negative impact of the award of these projects on the
country's balance of payments, there has also been
criticism from specific groups within Malaysia. The
Malaysian construction industry has expressed its
displeasure over the number of turnkey projects being
awarded to Japanese contractors. Malaysian contractors
have asserted that at least some of these projects could
6 7have been undertaken by local contractors. A second
criticism of the award of such contracts to Japanese
firms is related to the fact that Japanese firms have
won contracts despite the fact that their quotation were
6 8far in excess of other bidders.
Implicit in 'Look East' policy was the
expectation that technology transfer to Malaysia would 
6 9be enhanced. Based on the discussion in section 5 
(Transfer of technology) it can be said that the modus 
operandi of Japanese firms in Malaysia does not encourage 
the process of technology transfer. There is no evidence 
of formal training of Malaysian personnel that can
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indicate that technology transfer has taken place.
More often the unskilled labour is expected to 'pick up
sufficient skills' in the normal process of working side
70by side with the Japanese. However, if it is 
Malaysia's expectation to increase technology transfer 
by awarding large infrastructure projects to Japanese 
firms, the responsibility of ensuring that such transfer 
does actually take place cannot be left entirely to 
Japanese altruism. The Malaysian government should 
impose the necessary conditions to ensure that a transfer 
of technology does in fact take place. The failure of 
the Malaysian government to impose such conditions is 
probably the main reason for the absence of technology 
transfer from projects awarded to Japanese firms.
With regard to investments, the declining 
trend in both absolute and relative terms after the 
implementation of the 'Look East' policy (Table 1.9) 
indicates that there is no positive response to the 
policy as was hoped for by Malaysia.
Thus far it would appear that the Look East 
policy hinders rather than accelarates the development 
of the Malaysian economy. The large outflow of foreign 
exchange because of contracts awarded to the Japanese 
contributes to the deficits in the balance of payment. 
These contracts are awarded to the Japanese to hasten 
the process of technology transfer. However there is 
no evidence of technology transfer. Concerning the 
emulation of Japanese work practices and ethics, it is
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desirable to instill good work ethics, discipline and 
loyalty. However these characteristics alone cannot 
guarantee productivity increase. For successful 
emulation of Japanese work practices and ethics, other 
initiatives at the domestic i.e. Malaysian level are 
required. There is yet no evidence that the government 
is aware of the type of changes that may be required to 
facilitate the absorption of Japanese work ethics and 
attitudes by the Malaysian labour force.
7. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to analyse the major 
components of the economic relationship between Malaysia 
and Japan. This bilateral economic relationship is 
significant to Malaysia because Japan is it's dominant 
trading partner, a major investor and consequently a 
major source of technology. The nature of the relation­
ship between Malaysia and Japan is primarily influenced 
by the difference in their economic strength. Japan's 
economic preponderance is manifested by its dominance 
in all major aspects of its economic relations with 
Malaysia.
The Malaysia-Japan trade relations has expanded 
rapidly, but two aspect of the trade relations remains 
by and large unsatisfactory from the Malaysian point of 
view. First, Malaysia remains an exporter of primary 
commodities and an importer of manufactured products and 
capital goods. This neo-colonial trade relations is in
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Japan's interest because it ensures a flow of natural 
resource inputs for its industries and provides a market 
for its manufactured products. Malaysia on the other 
hand, is unable to diversify its exports to include a 
large proportion of manufactured products and processed 
primary commodities. The need to diversify is more 
urgent in the 1980s because of the declining prices of 
Malaysia's major primary commodities namely rubber, tin 
and palm oil. Diversification into higher value-added 
exports, namely manufactured exports, represent a long­
term strategy to achieve a more balanced bilateral trade 
relationship with Japan. But it is precisely in this 
area that Malaysia-Japan trade relations are not 
evidencing any change. The responsibility for this lies 
in Japanese trade practices such as tariff and non-tariff 
protectionism.
Second, the trade balance tends to be in Japan 
favour. LNG and crude oil exports to Japan conceals 
the long-term tendency of a persistent trade deficit for 
Malaysia in its trade with Japan. The implications on 
growth prospects of a deficit in trade balance with its 
most important trading partner are obvious. But barring 
major changes in the exports of Malaysia to Japan, the 
deficit in the trade balance will in all probability 
become even more pronounced.
Japan is a major foreign investor in Malaysia 
and largely as a result of the attractive and liberal 
terms offered by the government under the 1968 Investment
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Incentive Act. But the benefits accurring to Malaysia 
from Japanese investments are not significant and in 
some instances tend to work contrary to the objectives 
of the Malaysian government. The concentration of 
Japanese investment in a few industries would seem to 
imply that Japanese investment does not make a substantial 
contribution to expanding the industrial base of Malaysia. 
Likewise the employment generated by Japanese investment 
in Malaysia is small. Furthermore there is little 
evidence that Japanese foreign investment makes 
significant contribution to technology transfer. In 
some instances Japanese investment * can undermine 
Malaysia's development objectives. For examples, the 
concentration of Japanese investment in the more 
developed states of Malaysia conflicts with Malaysia's 
objective of balanced regional growth. Overall Japanese 
investment activities result in a dependency relationship 
which would suggest that the distribution of benefits 
of Japanese investment in Malaysia is in Japan's favour.
In light of the preceding conclusion the 
question is, should Malaysia foster closer economic ties 
with Malaysia? The general thrust of the Look East 
policy is obviously to foster closer economic relations 
with Japan. The discussion in this chapter would seem 
to suggest that the Look East policy is misplaced.
In the long term it will only reinforce the existing 
dependency relationship. And barring major altruistic 
initiatives by Japan to reciprocate Malaysia's Look East
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policy the benefits from a closer economic relationship 
between Japan and Malaysia is likely to benefit Japan 
more than Malaysia.
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CHAPTER TWO
MALAYSIA - JAPAN RELATIONS : THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 
1. Introduction
Japan's political involvement in the Southeast 
Asian region is of recent origin. Up until the 1970s, 
Japan's political involvement in Southeast Asia was 
negligible. Japan's primary concern war, its economic 
interests in the region. The exclusive concentration 
on economic ties resulted in political backlash which 
took the form of anti Japanese street riots during the 
Asean visit of Prime Minister Tanaka in 1974. The 
demonstrations and riots took place because Japan's 
economic ties with the Southeast Asian countries was 
considered to be exploitative rather than mutually 
beneficial.'*' In view of its enormous economic stake 
in the region, Japan had to re-evaluate its relationship 
with these states. Japan came to the realization that 
in order to safeguard its economic interest in the 
region Japan had to make a positive contribution toward 
the economic and political stability of Southeast Asia. 
In other words, Japan realized that in addition to an 
economic role it also had to project a political role 
in the region. In Japan's view, cooperation within 
Asean is a major determinant of political stability in
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Southeast Asia. Japan realized that by strengthening 
cooperation within Asean it would make a positive
2contribution toward the stability of Southeast Asia.
Therefore Japan began to get itself involved more fully
with Asean by articulating its political role towards
3Asean's interest in Southeast Asia. To what extent 
does Japan's political involvement in the region 
complements Malaysia's political interests and perceptions? 
This issue will be the major focus of this chapter.
However prior to discussing the central issue it will 
be useful to review the major components in the foreign 
policy of Malaysia and Japan.
2. Malaysia's Foreign Policy
Malaysia's foreign policy will be reviewed by 
considering the major components and developments for 
the period between 1957 and the first half of the 1980s.
At the time of independence, Malaysia was 
closely aligned to Britain by way of economic, political, 
cultural and defence linkages. Britain was Malaysia's 
major trading partner and major source of foreign 
investment. Malaysia absorbed the British political 
and administrative practices and institutions. Britain 
also provided professional and tertiary education 
facilities for Malaysia. Malaysia was also dependent 
on Britain's security guarantee formalized through the
4Anglo Malaysian Defence Agreement. All these links 
enabled Britain to influence Malaysia's foreign policy
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to project a prowestern image. In 1970 the Anglo
Malaysian Defence Agreement of 1957 lapsed and was
replaced by the Five Power Defence Arrangement. Also
in 1970 Malaysia obtained membership in the Non Aligned
Movement and subsequently Malaysia established contacts
with other members of the movement and became actively
involved in the movement. These two developments began
the process of loosening of links between Malaysia and
Britain. This process was gradual throughout the 1970s
and culminated in 1982 when Malaysia adapted an anti
British attitude and implemented the 'Buy British Last'
policy. Such an attitude is the result of Malaysia's
dissatisfaction over the British government's policies
5and attitudes towards Malaysia.
Malaysia's involvement in the Non Aligned 
Movement and the loosening of ties with Britain 
influenced its international outlook. First, Malaysia 
began to diversify and develop new contacts with other 
states in the international community. For example, 
Malaysia established and expanded links with the 
Islamic states. Malaysia also became actively involved 
in the Organization of Islamic Conference; in mediation 
efforts in the Iran-Iraq Conflict; and it also maintains 
strong support for the struggle of the Palestinian 
people and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
In addition to the Islamic states, Malaysia also took 
the initiative to foster links with the Pacific Island 
states of Fiji, Western Samoa, Tonga, Papua New Guinea
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and Maldives. Second, Malaysia also developed a more 
independent posture which by comparison is a far cry 
from its pro western image which it projected at the 
time of its independence. Malaysia now asserts political 
independence in international affairs and provides 
support to the initiatives of the Non Aligned Movement.
Another component of Malaysia's foreign policy 
is its reaction toward communism. For more than a 
decade since independence, Malaysia demonstrated strong 
and rigid opposition towards communism both within the 
country and internationally. Such an attitude was caused 
by its own experience of political subversion and 
guerilla terrorism during the communist insurgency 
which took place between 1948 and 1960. In the 1970s, 
Malaysia relaxed its rigid anti communist posture when 
it adopted a policy which makes a clear distinction 
between internal communism and external communism.
To reflect its new posture Malaysia took the initiative 
to establish diplomatic ties with several communist 
states in Europe and Asia. The most significant effort 
was the establishment of diplomatic ties between 
Malaysia and the People's Republic of China which 
maintains links with the Malaysian Communist Party (MCP).
Regionalism represents a significant component
of Malaysia's foreign policy. Since independence,
Malaysia has actively fostered regional cooperation and
participated in the creation of several regional
7organizations in Southeast Asia. Currently Malaysia
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participates actively in Asean, a regional organization 
established in 1967 to enhance the development of member 
states through regional, economic, social and cultural
Qcooperation. Asean is significant to Malaysia's
foreign policy because Malaysia like other member states,
utilizes Asean as a channel to pursue its political and
9economic policies. The Asean member states have 
cultivated solidarity and cohesion within the regional 
organization which enables them to work together for 
their common good. Furthermore Asean as a regional 
grouping provides its member states the leverage of 
collective bargaining to promote their interest.10 
Thus far it has been generally observed that Asean as 
a regional grouping has been more successful in the 
political sphere than in the economic sphere.11
In the security component of Malaysia's 
foreign policy, Malaysia's focus is on the security of 
Southeast Asia, its immediate vicinity. In 1970 
Malaysia introduced the concept of creating a Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast 
Asia to promote regional peace. ZOPFAN is concerned 
with the maintenance of security in Southeast Asia by 
excluding superpower and other major power involvement 
and intervention in the region. In the 1971 Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration, Asean adopted ZOPFAN as its policy for 
establishing regional security in Southeast Asia.
Thus far there has not been much headway in the
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implementation of this policy, mainly due to the
Kampuchean crises; and the lack of common understanding
among Asean member states concerning the definition of
the concept. To overcome these impediments, Malaysia
through Asean is actively involved in finding an
amicable political solution to the Kampuchean crises.
With regard to the problems related to the definition
of the concept, Malaysia emphasises the need to consider
the practical aspects of the implementation of the
concept, and also the need to consistent1y rationalize
the principles of ZOPFAN with the realities of the 
121980s.
Economic diplomacy represents another component 
of Malaysia's foreign policy. Malaysia's economic 
diplomacy is determined primarily by the nature of its 
economy and its major economic objectives and priorities. 
Malaysia is basically a primary commodity producer with 
an open economy which is subject to price fluctuations 
in the international commodity markets. As such 
Malaysia needs to develop the capacity to influence the 
pricing mechanism of its major export commodities.
Hence Malaysia participates actively in various 
negotiating forums such as the International Natural 
Rubber Organization (INRO), International Tin Council 
(ITC) and the Association of Tin Producing Countries 
(ATPC). In order to hasten the development process, 
the Malaysian government also constantly formulates
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policies to foster and encourage new trade relations, 
foreign investment, foreign aid and technology transfer.
For example, in order to enhance the industrialization 
process, the government implemented numerous policies 
such as tax incentives, protectionist policies to 
protect local infant industries and the Look East policy.
With regard to Japan, Malaysia maintains 
cordial and amicable relations despite its past
unpleasant experience during the Japanese Occupation in 
the Second World War. The economic component represents 
the major aspect of the bilateral relationship between 
Malaysia and Japan and this component became increasingly 
more significant when the Look East policy was announced 
in 1982. Malaysia's approach to the political and 
military issues in its bilateral relations with Japan 
is guided by its desire to safeguard its national interest. 
Furthermore since Malaysia has only limited political 
influence and military capacity, Malaysia is primarily 
concerned about political and military issues that 
could destabilize the Southeast Asian region.
3. Japan's Foreign Policy
The formulation of Japanese foreign policy 
since independence takes place within a framework set 
by the 1947 Japanese Constitution and the 1954 US-Japan 
Security Treaty. The Japanese Constitution, in Article 
9, makes provision for the renunciation of war, non­
possession of war potential and the rejection of the
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right to belligerency. Japan was only allowed to
maintain a self defence force which is a basic right of
every sovereign state. Japan realized its inability to
protect its territory integrity from external threat
and therefore accepted the United States' security
guarantee against external aggression and nuclear threat
which was formalized through the US-Japan Security
Treaty. However the United States' influence was not
limited to the military aspect of Japan's foreign
policy only. The United States' influence also embraces
13the political, economic and cultural aspects. In fact
it was the United States that moulded Japan's interest
14toward the international community.
In the immediate postwar period, Japan 
identified economic reconstruction as its primary task. 
In its First Diplomatic White Book in 1957 it was stated 
'that the only way to raise living standards, to achieve 
economic development, and to strengthen national power 
lay in the peaceful overseas development of economic 
power'.^  The reconstruction of the Japanese economy 
required access to foreign markets, technology, raw 
materials and fuel supplies. To obtain these inputs 
Japan needed to establish amicable economic ties with 
countries that can contribute towards developing its 
economy and industrial sector.
The rejection of belligerency and the 
concentration on economic reconstruction under the 
American security umbrella resulted in Japan pursuing
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a value free diplomacy and a foreign policy which made
a clear distinction between economics and politics.
This policy however was never a credible policy and it
16became increasingly impractical in the 1970s. For 
example, this policy does not apply to Japan's relations 
with the superpowers. The United States is a strategic 
ally to Japan while the Soviet Union is a major source 
of threat to Japan. Similarly the conclusion of a 
Peace Treaty between Japan and China is evidence that 
Japan has chosen China in preference to the Soviet 
Union. Furthermore it was impossible to pursue a policy 
which separates politics from economics when other 
states such as the Middle Eastern States to precisely 
the opposite, that is, using economic power to attain 
political goals in their bilateral relations with Japan.
The emergence of Japan as an economic power
brought about changes in the US-Japan relationship in
the mid 1970s. Unlike in the earlier period, the US
was no longer willing to accept Japan's concentration
on economic ties only. The US began to pressure Japan
to assume a more active international role commensurate
17with its status as an economic power. In more 
specific terms, the US wants Japan to share its defence 
and security burden in Asia. The lack of credibility 
in its foreign policy and the US's pressure caused 
Japan to re examine its foreign policy. Japan's search 
for a new foreign policy had to take into account the 
following factors namely, the need to maintain a
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relation with the US based on mutual trust and 
cooperation in order to maintain the credibility of 
its security arrangement; Japan's external security 
vis-a-vis Soviet expanisionism and massive build-up; 
and the reaction of countries such as the Asean states 
with which Japan has extensive economic links.
The solution to Japan's foreign policy 
dilemma took the form of the 'Comprehensive National 
Security Concept' which was introduced in 1980. The 
Comprehensive National Security was defined as a policy 
to "secure our national survival or protect our social 
order from various kinds of external threats which will 
or may have serious effects on the foundation of our 
nation's existence, by preventing the arising of such 
threats, or by properly coping with them in the case of 
their emergence, through the combination of diplomacy
18natural defence, economic and other policy measures".
In the Comprehensive National Security Concept, Japan 
identifies three pillars of foreign policy namely 
economic, political and military, and emphasises that 
all three components are equally important for Japan's 
security. But Japan's contribution to global peace 
and security will be through various forms of economic 
aid programmes and mutually beneficial trade and 
investment relations. Based on the comprehensive 
concept, Japan pursued an 'omni dimensional diplomacy’ 
also known as 'multi dimensional peace diplomacy'.
Such an orientation was intended to put into practice
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the clause in Japan's constitution preamble on 'trusting 
in the justice and faith of the ..... people of the
.19world.
The Comprehensive National Security Concept
had a significant impact on Japan's defence. The
concept enabled the government to gradually increase
20its defence spending without much opposition. Japan 
thus stepped up its defence spending to strengthen and 
modernize the self defence forces (SDF). The increased
defence spending was perceived to cause fears among
*
other states in the region. To ally any fears among other
states Japan also stepped up its Overseas Development
21Aid (ODA) quota.
In its new foreign policy, Japan reemphasised 
its identification with the United States and the 
Western Alliance. In the 1981 diplomatic White Book 
it was stated:
'Our country shares in common with the
United States, the European Community and
other advanced democracies basic political
and economic values, and the country's
peace and stability are closely related
with the peace and stability of advanced
democratic society as a whole. This is
the reason why solidarity and cooperation
with these nations must be the key basis
for the conduct of Japan's active peace , 22diplomacy .
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The current Japanese administration seem to
reaffirm its association with the US and the Western
Alliance. The Prime Minister, Mr. Nakasone has talked
about Japan's 'common fate' with the US and the West
and has referred to Japan's role as an 'unsinkable
aircraft carrier'. In fact strengthening Japan's
solidarity with the US and other Western countries is
23one of Mr. Nakasone's basic diplomatic goal. A major 
challenge to this objective is the present crises in 
the United States - Japan economic relations. The 
major problem is the increasing trade deficits. The 
United States runs a larger deficit with Japan than 
with any other country: The resolution of this crises 
will determine the future of the United States - Japan 
relationship.
Japan's policy toward Malaysia is contained 
in its policy toward the Asean countries collectively. 
From the end of the Second World War up to the mid 
1970s, Japan was primarily interested only in its 
economic ties with the Asean states. Japan has 
extensive trade, investment and aid links with these 
states. It was also dependent on these states for raw 
material, fuel supplies and market for its finished 
products. There is also the strategic waterway, the 
Straits of Malacca, through which Japan's oil purchases 
from the Gulf has to pass through. Following the anti 
Japanese riots during Mr. Tanaka's visit to the Asean 
states, Japan was forced to reexamine its relations
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with the Asean states. Consequently in 1977, Prime 
Minister Fukuda laid out a set of guidelines that would 
regulate Japan's relations with the Asean states. 
Commonly known as the 'Fukuda Doctrine' the following 
principles were established:
(1) First, Japan a nation committed to peace, 
rejects the role of a military power, and 
on that basis is resolved to contribute to 
the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia 
and the world community.
(2) Second, Japan, as a true friend of the 
countries of Southeast Asia, will do its 
best for consolidating the relationship of 
mutual confidence and truest based on 
'heart to heart' understanding with these 
countries, in wide ranging fields covering 
not only political and economic areas but 
also social and cultural areas.
(3) Third, Japan will be an equal partner of 
Asean and its member countries, and cooperate 
positively with them in their own efforts
to strengthen their solidarity and 
resilience, together with other nations of 
the like mind outside the region, while 
aiming at fostering a relationship based 
on mutual understanding with the nations
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of Indochina and will thus contribute to
the building of peace and prosperity
throughout Southeast Asia.
The Fukuda Doctrine sets the framework for Japan to 
play a political role in Southeast Asia. The 'Fukuda 
Doctrine' was accompanied by an aid package valued at 
$ 1 billion for the Asean Industrial Complementation 
Projects plus an additional economic assistance of 
¥ 400 billion. The Yen loan and the 'Fukuda Doctrine' 
represents Japan's firm commitment towards the prosperity 
and stability of Asean. The current Japanese 
administration also reaffirms this commitment by 
emphasising the need to pursue 'heart to heart' 
diplomacy by accentuating the commonality of the Asean 
spirit and destiny which was latter dubbed 'Asean 
idealism'.
To what extent does Japan's political 
involvement in Southeast Asia complements Asean's 
efforts in maintaining the prosperity and stability in 
the region? This issue .will unavoidably influence 
Japan's political relations with Malaysia. In order 
to understand Japan's political involvement in Southeast 
Asia, three regional issues will be analysed. These 
issues will be considered in the context of Japan and 
Asean because that is how Japan approaches these issues. 
Nevertheless Malaysia's involvement and its perception 
on these issues will also be highlighted.
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4. The Kampuchean Crises
Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in December 1978 
and it subsequently established a pro-Vietnamese regime 
in Kampuchea headed by Heng Samrin in January 1979.
Since then Kampuchea became the battlefield between 
two contending forces namely the Vietnamese troops 
backing the Heng Samrin regime to pacify the country; 
and the Kampuchean resistance forces comprising of the 
ousted Pol Pot regime (also known as Khmer Rouge), 
the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) 
led by Sonn Sann and the Prince Sihanouk loyalists.
The Kampuchean conflict was caused by several 
factors. These include Vietnamese expansion ambition 
in Indochina; and the Sino-Soviet rivalry for power and 
influence in Indochina and Southeast Asia. The Sino- 
Soviet rivalry has caused this conflict to be generally 
regarded as a proxy war between China and the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union provides support and various 
forms of aid to Vietnam while China does the same for 
the communist Khmer Rouge regime, the largest resistance 
group.
The Kampuchean crises has detrimental effects 
on the Asean states. The conflict presents a threat 
to the security of the Asean states. The Asean states 
fear that if the Vietnamese invasion into Kampuchea 
goes unchallenged, the Vietnamese will not hesitate to 
venture beyond the Kampuchean border into the Asean
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region. Another detrimental effect of the Kampuchean 
conflict is the increase in Soviet and Chinese 
involvement in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union and 
China represent major threat sources to the Asean states. 
In view of these destabilising effect, the Asean states 
have taken the initiative to find an amicable political 
solution to the crises.
Asean1s initial reaction to the Vietnamese 
invasion into Kampuchea was to condemn the action and 
express its strong protest. Asean also demanded an 
immediate and complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese 
troops from Kampuchea. The Vietnamese action was seen 
as an act of aggression that violated the norms 
sanctioned by international law (i.e. the violation of
27a nation’s territorial integrity by an external power). 
Following its protest against the Vietnamese invasion 
the Asean states coordinated a campaign against the 
legitimasation and acceptance of Vietnam’s intervention 
and occupation of Kampuchea. Asean ardently canvassed 
for political support to prevent the Heng Samrin regime 
from assuming the representative seat of the Kampuchean 
people in the United Nations. Instead Asean supported 
the continued seating of the ousted Pol Pot regime.
In June 1981, the Asean states laid out a set of 
proposals for resolving the conflict. The proposals 
called for:
(1) a UN peace keeping force in Kampuchea;
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(2) withdrawal of all foreign armed forces 
under the supervision of the UN peace 
keeping forces;
(3) disarming of all Khmer fractions immediately 
after the withdrawal of foreign forces; and
(4) an interim administration to conduct free
. . 2 iand fair elections under the UN supervision.
In order to facilitate the resolution of the 
conflict, Asean initiated an effort to build a united 
opposition against the Vietnamese by bringing together 
the three resistance fractions, i.e., the Khmer Rouge, 
the KPNLF and Prince Sihanouk's loyalists to form a 
tripartite coalition. Subsequently the tripartite 
coalition formed the government of Democratic Kampuchea 
headed by Prince Sihanouk in 1982. This government was 
intended eventually to replace the Vietnamese backed 
Heng Samrin regime.
The Asean states also pledged to continue 
their pressure on the United States to become involved 
in the process of finding a practical solution to the 
crises. Asean as a whole requested arms support for 
the Kampuchean resistance at the 1984 expanded foreign 
ministers' meeting.  ^ In response to this request the 
US Secretary of State Mr. Schulz replied:
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"We will continue to do our part, including
providing moral, political and humanitarian
support for the organization led by Prince
Sihanouk and Sonn Sann. We will not
support Khmer Rouge whose atrocities
30outraged the world."
Another of Asean's initiative was the proximity
talks proposals. This diplomatic initiative was mooted
by Malaysia's Foreign Minister in 1985. It involved
negotiations through an intermediary between Vietnam
31and the Kampuchean tripartite coalition. Thailand
proposed a modified version which involved talks between
the three fractions of the coalition and Vietnam.
In response to Malaysia's proposal Vietnam sent a high
level delegation to Kuala Lumpur to discuss this
proposal but since then there has been no progress.
Asean's current diplomatic initiative is to arrange an
informal meeting known as a 'cocktail party' for the
warring fractions. The proposal involves 'one meeting
initially among the Kampuchean parties, followed
32immediately by the participation of Vietnam'.
Japan's involvement in the Kampuchean crises
was motivated by its concern for the security and
stability of the region in which Japan has enormous
economic interests. In the wake of the Vietnamese
invasion into Kampuchea, Japan severed all forms of
economic assistance to Vietnam and joined the Asean
33states in condemning Vietnam's belligerency.
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Furthermore not only did Japan support Asean by voting
for the continued seating of the ousted regime at the
United Nations, Japan also lobbied extensively in the
African, Middle Eastern,Latin American and European
countries where Asean representation was weak or absent
34to support Asean's cause. Japan also agreed with
Asean that the United States should take more interest
in the Kampuchean crises. In 1979 Japan proposed that
the United States use its influence to organize an
35International Conference on Kampuchea. Consequently 
through the efforts of Japan, Asean and other states 
an International Conference on Kampuchea was held in 
1981. At the conference Japan was elected to join a 
consultative committee to advice the United Nation 
Secretary General on matters concerning a political 
solution to the Kampuchean problem.
Japan also attempted to be a mediator between 
Asean and China at the beginning of the Kampuchean 
conflict. During his Asean tour in 1981, Mr. Suzuki 
offered to play a mediator's role. He explained:
"We can talk with China about anything.
For example we could work on China and try 
to persuade them to do something that would 
be helpful to bring about a solution to 
this question".^
It was reported that in a meeting with China's ambassador
to Japan, the Japanese foreign minister explained the
Asean's views toward China and called on China to
37improve its relations with Asean.
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Japan also involved itself in efforts to counter
the refugee 'hazard' in the Asean states. The influx of
refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea was perceived
as a national threat and therefore the Asean states were
reluctant to accept the refugees. Therefore international
involvement was galvanised to obtain financial aid and
to resettle the refugees in other countries. Japan's
acceptances of refugees as citizens was negligible and
was criticized.38 However Japan's monetary contributions
3 9for the refugee programs was substantial. Japan also 
sent food and medical teams to various refugee camps.
Japan's economic aid is very significant to 
Vietnam's undeveloped economy. In response to Asean's 
request, Japan severed its economic aid to Vietnam in 
the wake of Vietnam's invasion into Kampuchea. Japan 
also declared that it would not lift its ban on economic 
aid to Vietnam as long as Japan refused to withdraw its 
military forces from Kampuchea. If however Vietnam 
would accept a political settlement (including 
withdrawal of armed forces) Japan has promised to provide 
reconstruction aid.^
Malaysia and Japan have similar perceptions on 
certain aspects of the Kampuchean conflict and they also 
disagree on some other aspects of the conflict. Both 
Malaysia and Japan want an amicable political solution 
to the conflict and this is obvious from the discussion 
above concerning their support and participation in 
efforts to resolve the conflict. Malaysia and Japan
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also demonstrate flexibility in their reaction towards
Vietnam and therefore reflect an inclination to
compromise on the crises. Japan was reluctant to sever
its economic aid to Vietnam because it did not want to
41isolate Vietnam. While Malaysia, unlike some of its
Asean partners does not consider Vietnam as the major
source of threat and therefore Malaysia tends to dismiss
Vietnam's expansive ambitions as an immediate threat to 
42the region. Malaysia and Japan have differing views 
concerning China's involvement in the conflict. Japan 
is comfortable with China's involvement in the conflict. 
Malaysia on the other hand sees China's involvement as 
a threat to the security in the region. Malaysia views 
China as the major security threat in the region and 
looks to a relatively strong Vietnam as a buffer against 
China.
From the discussion in this section, it is 
evident that Japan is supportive of Asean's efforts in 
resolving the Kampuchean conflict. Its symbolic and 
diplomatic support has been much appreciated by the 
Asean countries. Japan's involvement in the resolution 
of the conflict shows that Japan does project a political 
role in the region. However, this political role is 
minor and low keyed, and such passiveness leaves Japan's 
declared political commitment to the region yet to be 
tested.
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5. The Superpower Connection
The United States and Soviet Union emerged as 
the leaders of the 'Capitalist' and 'Socialist' worlds 
respectively at the end of the second world war. The 
relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union are basically 
characterised by cold war despite on-and-off short 
periods of detente. Being Superpowers it follows that 
the relations between the United States and Soviet Union 
permeate and affect relations between all other nations 
of the world. The discussion in this section will 
consider the Superpowers involvement in Southeast Asia, 
their influence on Japan's involvement in the region 
and Asean's reaction to the Superpower involvement in 
the region, including their influence on Japan's 
activities in the region.
The United States emerged as a victor out of 
the Second World War. It was also the only major 
country that was unscathed by the war. This advantage 
and the United States' monopoly of atomic power made it 
the pinnacle of power. This domination was however 
short lived. The Soviet Union soon recovered from the 
war and rose to challenge the United States' aspiration 
for world leadership. This confrontation, widely known 
as the Cold War, began in Europe when the United States 
attempted to contain the Soviet Union's effort in 
expanding its sphere of influence in Europe. The 1950's 
saw the extension of the Cold War to Asia. The 
proximity of several events, namely Mao Zedong's
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communist victory in China, the Korean War in 1950 and 
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
signed four months after the outbreak of the Korean War, 
was perceived by the United States as a communist scheme 
to extend its sphere of influence into Asia. To counter 
and contain the Soviet expansionism the United States
43established a global network of alliances such as SEATO, 
ANZUS and CENTO.^ It also established bilateral 
security relations with Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and 
the Philippines.
In Southeast Asia, the United States' and Soviet
attention was centered on Indochina. The United States'
involvement began during the war between the Vietnam and
the French. The United States' involvement deepened in
the Vietnam War because of the United States' fear that
the domino theory would become a reality. The United
States regarded the non-communist states in Southeast
Asia as highly vulnerable to the communist subversion.
Hence the United States increased its involvements in
the region. The United States filled the power vaccum
left behind by the colonial powers and through SEATO,
which was set up in 1954, the United States' position
in the region was further strengthened. However the
United States' interest in these states (i.e. the
non-communist states in Southeast Asia) was selective.
The United States' attention was primarily focussed
on Thailand and the Philippines. Thailand was used
as a major site for United States' air and naval
46bases during the Vietnam war. Thailand also blocked
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communist land access to Malaysia and Singapore. The
Philippines' importance is attributable to historical
factors and also because of the United States' air and
47naval bases there. Malaysia and Singapore were
regarded as Commonwealth responsibilities and therefore
relations between these two countries and the United
4 8States were somewhat distant.
Toward the late 1960s, the United States
reassessed its participation in the Vietnam War and its
role as 'world policeman'. Its new policy was to a
large extent influenced by the relaxation of tensions
49between the Superpowers i.e., detente. The major
outcome of detente was the shift in emphasis in the
foreign policy of the Superpowers. Ideological
considerations were no longer as important as in the
earlier period. The United States' new policy toward
Southeast Asia was set out in the Nixon Doctrine of 
501969. The United States decided to disengage 
militarily from Indochina and also to transfer the 
primary defense responsibility to individual states and 
local powers. The Nixon doctrine set the stage for the 
United States to project a low profile in Asia, a 
posture which it continues to maintain at the present 
time.
The United States' withdrawal from Indochina 
occurred with the realization that the area is not vital 
to its national interest. The United States nevertheless 
has important interests as distinguished from vital
90
interest in the region which make it necessary to
51maintain a presence in Southeast Asia. The region is
of strategic significance to the United States for two
reasons. First, it is a region connecting the Pacific
and Indian Oceans. Freedom of passage through the
straits is vital for the efficient operation of the
United States Seventh Fleet. The straits are also the
petroleum'lifeline'for the United States's allies in
East Asia. Second, the United States's bases in the
Philippines have great significance to the United States
defence structure for the Asia-Pacific region. Third,
politically, these non-communist states being members
of Asean are significant to the United States. Asean as
a regional organization represents an obstacle to the
growth of Soviet influence in the region. Hence it is
in the United States' interest to maintain peace and
stability in these states. The United States aims to
achieve this by providing various forms of aid to
develop the market economies of these states. The
United States is a major trading partner of these states
and similarly Asean is also a major trading partner of
the United States. Asean was United States's fifth
52largest trading partner in 1985.
In view of its vital interest in Southeast Asia, the 
United States has to take into account the major threat 
sources that can destabilize the region. The United 
States' perception of the source of external threat to 
Southeast Asia has altered over the years. In the
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1950s and 1960s China was considered the major threat
and therefore the United States' policy was directed
toward the containment of China. The Sino-American
rapprochement in 1978 made China a de facto ally and a
significant partner in the United States' effort to
contain Soviet Union's expansionism in Asia. The Soviet
Union and Vietnam now represent the primary threat to
the United States' interest in Southeast Asia. The
increased Soviet military presence is related to the
Soviet Union's access to air and naval facilities in
Cam Rhan Bay and DaNang. The Cam Rhan Bay facility has
been transformed into the largest Soviet naval forward
53deployment base outside of the Warsaw Pact. The
United States however is not unduly alarmed by the
Soviet presence. There is a very low probability that
the Soviet Union will attempt to close the sea lanes
or strike the United States' bases in Philippines except
54in the context of a global confrontation. Also
Southeast Asia is not a vital area for the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union has placed greater priority on other
region in Asia, namely the Northeast Asia and South and
55Southwest Asia.
The United States' concern with Vietnam is
related to the threat it poses to Asean. In the United
States' view the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea is
linked to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet
5 6activities in Africa and the Middle East. Also it 
was Vietnam's dependence on Soviet aid that provided
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the Soviet Union with the opportunity to increase its
presence and influence in the region. The United States
apparently believes that Vietnam has a desire to obtain
hegemony in Southeast Asia and a status as a regional
power. The United States' however does not perceive
any immediate Vietnam threat to the Asean states because
57of its involvement in Kampuchea.
Despite the Kampuchean crises, and the increased
Soviet presence in the region, the United States regards
Southeast Asia as a relatively stable area and therefore
the United States continues to maintain its low profile
5 8policy in the region. However to project a sustainable
role in Southeast Asia, the United States emphasises
59burden sharing. Japan is United States' most important 
ally in the context of United States' policy to counter 
Soviet threat in the Asian region. At present the 
United States depends primarily on Japan's economic ties 
with the Asean states to complement the United States 
presence in Southeast Asia. Japan's economic ties with 
the Asean states accelerates United States efforts to 
develop the market economies of the Asean states, and 
this in turn will ensure stability in the region and 
hinder the expansion of Soviet influence in Southeast 
Asia. Since the mid 70s the United States has been 
pressuring Japan to increase its defence capabilities.
The United States position is not that Japan should 
assume military commitments in Southeast Asia but that 
it should be taking over more of the responsibility of
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its own conventional military defence to free the United 
States' resources for other commitments. This policy 
has an impact on the security of Southeast Asia. Some 
have argued that Japan by increasing its self defence 
capabilities (without a direct military role in Southeast 
Asia) would be enhancing military capabilities of the 
United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This could 
provoke the Soviets into responding in kind and thereby 
increasing tension in the Asian region generally and 
also complicating the regional balance. It can also 
be argued that increased Japanese defence capabilities 
would allow the United States to divert forces from the 
defence of Japan to other areas in the South such as 
Southeast Asia. The increased United States presence 
will also increase the probability of a US - Soviet 
confrontation in the region. Because of the potential 
implications on the security of Southeast Asia, the 
United States - Japan relationship has become a source 
of concern for the states in the region. Can similar 
Asean reaction be expected towards Japan - Soviet
relations in the region?
The Soviet Union's interest in Southeast Asia
is said to have begun in the 1920s and 1930s. A logical
extension of Lenin's theories of imperialism was to
 ^ 61attack the capitalist system where it was weakest.
This implied the colonial and semicolonial areas where 
communism could take advantage of rising nationalism. 
Thus the Soviet Union encouraged the formation of
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communist parties throughout Southeast Asia (except
Burma). The Soviet Union as a state however had no
presence in Southeast Asia then.
After the Second World War the Soviet Union's
involvement in Asia was limited until it adapted a more
6 2flexible foreign policy in 1956. This new posture was
manifested in Southeast Asia in the Soviet Union's
relations with Indonesia. Between 1957 and 1962 the
Soviet Union provided economic, political and military
aid to Indonesia in return for political gains which
6 3proved to be disappointing and shortlived. Following 
this the Soviet Union focussed its attention on the 
Indochina states. The Soviet Union provided economic 
and military aid including sophisticated heavy weaponary 
to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. The Soviet 
Union did not wish to limit its influence in the region 
to Indochina. It was also interested in extending its 
influence to include the non-communist states in 
Southeast Asia. However it was not as successful in its 
relations with these states as it was in Indochina.
The non-communist states were suspicious of Soviet 
interests in the region. They were aware of the Soviet 
Union's ideological and hegomonic aspirations and hence 
were cautious in their response to the Soviet Union's 
diplomatic and economic overtures. The Soviet presence 
in the region was one of the major factors that caused 
concern about regional security among the non communist 
states which in turn led to the formation of Asean in
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6 41967. Asean at the time of its formation represented 
a pro western and anti-communist approach to regional 
security and cooperation. The pattern of relations 
between Asean and the Soviet Union has altered several 
times over the last twenty years in response to shifts 
in the Soviet's objectives and developments in the 
region.
The Soviet Union pursued a policy of hostility
toward Asean in the initial years. The Soviet Union
condemned it as an imperialist creation for stamping
out the national liberation struggle of the Asian people.
Then in the early 1970s, international detente was
formalized through big power agreements and the
termination of the Vietnam War was in sight. Because
of these factors the Soviet Union adjusted its policy
toward Asean as one which could be described as only
moderately hostile. The Asean proposals for the
neutralization of Southeast Asia by creating ZOPFAN
announced in the 1970s mitigated the Soviet's hostility
toward Asean. To the Soviets, a neutral Asean was more
favourable than a prowestern and anti-communist posture
6 6which Asean thus far projected. Throughout the latter
half of the 1970s and up to the present time the Soviet
Union's attitude toward Asean became increasingly
positive. The Soviet Union has intensified its diplomatic
6 7and economic overtures toward these states. But 
unlike the United States, the Soviet Union does not 
have economic clout in the region. And politically
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the Soviet Union has very little influence over the Asean 
states. Nevertheless the Soviet Union has significant 
interests in the region which are as follows:
(1) to check the United States' economic, political 
and military expansion and influence in the 
region.
(2) to contain the expansion of China's influence 
in Southeast Asia.
(3) to establish a presence and influence in this 
region that is commensurate with its status 
as a Superpower.
(4) strategic considerations require that the Soviet 
Union has freedom of passage in Southeast Asian 
waters for two reasons. First, the sea lanes
of communications passing through Southeast 
Asia remain an important link between the Soviet 
Union's eastern and western extremities.
Second, it is also important for the maintenance 
of balance fleet deployment between the Pacific 
and Indian Ocean.68
The Soviet Union does not only have the United 
States as a rival in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union 
also has to compete with Japan and this contributes to 
the existing tensions in the Soviet - Japan relations. 
Within its immediate vicinity in Northeast Asia, Japan 
views the Soviet Union as its most dangerous neighbour.
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There is also the unsettled dispute over the Kurile 
Islands that contribute to tension in the Soviet - Japan 
relations. In Southeast Asia there are several factors 
which aggrevate the tension in the Soviet - Japan 
relations. First, Japan's extensive economic links with 
the Asean states are seen as a hinderance to the Soviet
69efforts to expand its economic links with these states.
Second,in the postwar era Japan has functioned as an
adjunct of United States policy in Asia and this implies
that Japan's influence in the Southeast Asia will
complement the United States' influence and efforts to
build a credible deterrent to counter the Soviet presence
in the region. The Soviet Union view Japan's presence
in Southeast Asia with considerable suspicions and has
embarked on a campaign aimed at exploiting the difference
that arise in Asean's trade relations with Japan and
70the United States.
The Asean states view the Superpower rivalry
in the region with concern. The Southeast Asian
strategic thinkers see the escalation of United States -
Soviet tensions as a threat to the Asean region. The
endorsement of ZOPFAN concept by the Asean states is
said to be 'a manifestation of their desire to make the
Southeast Asian region free from the conflict between
71US and USSR or between any other great power.'
However the ZOPFAN concept remains a long term 
objective because pre conditions for achieving such a 
zone does not exist. In the meantime the Asean states
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have to accommodate the Superpower presence in the
region. Generally the United States and the Asean states
find themselves in basic agreement on most political and
72security issues. The Asean governments also look to
the United States as the ultimate external guarantor of
7 3their security. The Soviet Union on the other hand, 
represents a major threat source but not a direct 
or immediate threat at the present time. Nevertheless 
the Asean governments distrust the Soviet Union and have 
been very cautious in their dealings with the Soviet 
Union.
The Superpowers' influence on Japan has become 
a source of concern to Asean because of the resulting 
impact on the security of the region. The Asean states 
are comfortable with the existing United States - Japan 
alliance and accept their combined presence in the 
region. However the Asean states are apprehensive about 
the United States pressure on Japan to assume a greater 
portion of its self defence responsibilities. This 
apprehension can be explained by three factors. First, 
the ambiguity in the definition of the term 'self defence' 
makes Japan pledge not to project a military role in 
Southeast Asia questionable especially in view of its 
vital interests in the region.74 Second, the political 
instability in Philippines which can jeopardize the 
United States strategic advantage in the region.
Third, the insecurities that can arise if the United 
States projects a greater presence in the region.
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With regard to Soviet influence on Japan, the Asean
states also view this as a potential source of threat
which need to be taken more seriously because of the
Soviet Union's recent initiative to expand its economic
75ties with the Asean states.
Superpower rivalry in Southeast Asia not only 
contributes to tensions in the region but they also 
influence Japan's links with the Asean states. The 
potential insecurities in the region arising from the 
United States's and Soviet Union's presence in Southeast 
Asia has to a certain extent increased Asean's and 
Japan's attention to security issues which otherwise 
might be neglected in favour of economic issues.
6. China Relations
The China question is a significant issue to 
the Asean states and Japan. China, situated in Northeast 
Asia, is geographically in close proximity to Japan.
The main security threat to Japan remains the presence 
of overpowering communist states in its immediate 
vicinity. While previously Japan considered both the 
Chinese and Soviet threats, it now has only the Soviet 
threat to worry about. China now has amicable relations 
with Japan and joins Japan in countering the increasingly 
domineering Soviet presence in the region.
japan's post-war policy toward China dovetails 
with the United States' China policy. Throughout the 
Cold War Japan and the United States recognized the
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Kuomintang government in Taiwan under the leadership of
Chiang Kai Shek as the central government of China.
The drastic change in the United States' policy toward
China by President Nixon's decision to seek detente and
rapprochement with China was reflected in Japan's
relations with China. The Tanaka - Chou Communique in
September 1972 normalized relations between Japan and
China. This bilateral relationship, generally considered
successful, was further solidified by the signing of the
Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978. Since
the normalization of relations, economic ties in the
form of trade, investment and foreign aid increased
considerably between the two countries. For example in
1975 trade between the two countries reached a total of
$3.79 billion, the largest share of China's trade with
7 6a single trading partner at that time. Japan's oil 
imports from China also increased considerably since
77the signing of a $20 billion trade agreement in 1978. 
China's modernization programme provided a lot of 
investment and business opportunities for Japanese 
entrepreneurs.
The Japan - China bilateral relationship 
provided Japan with valuable leverage and assurance 
against the Soviet Union's increased deployment of 
strategic weapons system and general force build-up.
This Sino-Japanese convergence balances the reduced 
United States' presence in the Asia Pacific region 
generally. However there is no military cooperation
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between the two countries. It has been suggested that
China's amicable relations with Japan are motivated by
its intention to obtain military cooperation from Japan.
China has expressed hopes that Japan will help it
develop heavy industries and transfer technologies such
as radar technology, ship building, tank and armoured
7 8carrier design and computer technology. Japan
responded by reaffirming its decision not to provide
military aid to China and reiterated its willingness to
assist China's effort in developing and modernizing its 
79economy.
•. Concerning the Superpower rivalry Japan and
China have similar perceptions. Both China and Japan 
see the United States presence and influence in 
Northeast Asia as a stabilizing force vis-a-vis the 
Soviet presence. There now exist a United States - 
China - Japan axis to balance the Soviet presence and 
thereby ensuring stability in Northeast Asia.
With regard to Southeast Asia, Japan is of 
the opinion that China has a significant role in the 
region and is trying to bring China and the Asean states 
into a closer association. During his Asean tour in 
1983, the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Nakasone, said 
that in Japan's view:
" ....  China is big in size and population
and therefore it should play a constructive 
role in Asia".
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He also attempted to act as a mediator to hasten the
normalization of relations between China and Indonesia
81but was unsuccessful. Diplomatic ties between 
Indonesia and China were severed at the time of the 
abortive Communist Coup in 1965. Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines have established diplomatic ties 
with China. Their decision was influence by the desire 
to project neutrality in international politics and also 
by the reversal of the United States' policy toward 
China in the 1970s. Singapore does not have diplomatic 
ties with China. Singapore has declared that it will 
not establish relations until Indonesia has done so.
There is no uniform Southeast Asia attitude
toward China. A persistent source of stress among Asean
members is their different views toward China. Thailand
and Singapore have been most appreciative of China's
role in pressuring Vietnam. They are also least concerned
about China's support for revolutionary movements in the 
8 2region. Indonesia, whose past experience of China's 
support of the Indonesian Communist party and the 1965 
coup has caused it to distrust China, sees it as a long 
run threat to the entire region. Malaysia shares a 
similar view of China because of its long struggle 
against the armed uprising of the Malaysian Communist 
Party (MCP). The Philippines provide a moderating 
influence in support of Asean solidarity.
Despite the varying perceptions about China 
as a source of threat to Southeast Asia, there is
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general agreement among the Asean states that China 
still seeks to influence politics in Southeast Asia as 
it has traditionally done and also because of a more 
contemporary strategic objective, that is to prevent 
this area from falling under Soviet influence. Hence, 
despite repeated assurances by China that 'China will 
not interfere with the internal situation in Southeast 
Asia', the Asean states remain suspicious and skeptical
• g gabout China's involvement in the region. There is
also no clear indication that China has severed ties
with the communist parties in the region. Rather China's
policy of dividing its relations with the Asean states
into state-to-state, party-to-party and people-to-people
levels reinforces the view that China does maintain
84links with communist parties in the Asean states.
These states are also irritated by China's ambiguous
policies on the citizenship status of persons of Chinese
descent who have taken up citizenship in another 
8 5country. Its policy enables them to regain their 
Chinese citizenship if they return to China and it also 
allows them .entry into China without a visa. There is 
fear that the 22 million-odd Chinese in Southeast Asia 
are 'potential fifth columns' for China.
The Kampuchean crisis is the primary focus of 
China's policy in Southeast Asia at the present time. 
China's extensive involvement in the conflict is 
related to the general perception that this conflict is 
also a proxy war between China and Soviet Union.
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China supports the largest resistance fraction, the
Khmer Rouge. It provides various forms of aid and
support. China also supports Asean initiatives toward
finding a political solution as long as it does not have
to compromise its interest. For example China does not
agree with the Asean proposal that after the withdrawal
of all foreign troops and before a United Nation
supervised election is held, all elements within the
country would have to disarm. China would not accept
this proposition because the Khmer Rouge fraction would
lose the advantage of being the strongest armed
8 6Kampuchean group. China is also part of the anti-
Soviet- Vietnamese coalition together with the United
States, Japan and Asean.
There are also economic issues that influence
China's relations with the Asean states. Deng Xio Ping's
effort to modernize and develop China has both positive
and negative implications on the Southeast Asian region.
China's concentration on economic development leaves it
very little resources to pursue hegemonic ambitions in
Southeast Asia. Successful modernization could cause
China to become a responsible member of the world
community. This in turn might cause it to discontinue
its support for communist activities in the Asean 
8 7countries. China's economic progress could also 
provide new economic opportunities for Asean states to 
exploit. However the Asean states have also expressed 
fears that China's modernization programme is attracting
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Japanese resources away from the Asean states. Prime 
Minister Suzuki attempted to allay this fear by stressing 
that it was unfounded and that Japan's economic 
assistance to China 'will not be at the expanse of
balance. China's modernization programme also includes
modernization and expansion of China's military
capabilities. Asean states fear that a China with a
strong economy and enormous military build-up will pose
a greater threat to the security of the region.
Malaysia and Indonesia expressed dismay at the United
States' decision to sell 'dual use'* technology to China
89for its military modernization.
by the present Prime Minister in the following manner.
"a well developed China, with its enormous 
military might and high population could 
very well tempt its leaders to venture 
downwards especially to Southeast Asia.
The repeated pronouncements against 
hegemony by the present Chinese leadership 
does not necessarily mean that they have 
given up the idea of hegemony. If the 
same Chinese leadership can make 180 degree 
turn to offer hands of friendship to 
countries it once regarded as enemies it 
is no guarantee that the future leadership
will not reverse the
Malaysia and other Asean members are aware of
the divergence in interests between them and Japan with 
regard to China. It is very unlikely that Japan and 
Malaysia will be willing to compromise their view about 
China. However in view of economic and security
Asean'.88 Instead Japan will endeavour to maintain a
Malaysia's perception of China is explained
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interests, both Malaysia and Japan will endeavour to 
maintain their current relations with each other 
independent of their individual relationship with China.
7. Conclusion
With the Fukuda Doctrine Japan projected a 
political role in the region. Japan intended to 
articulate its policies and actions to be associated 
with the Asean states and thereby complement Asean's 
efforts to maintain peace and stability in Southeast 
Asia. The Asean states on the other hand, have 
acknowledged that Japan can project a constructive 
political role in the region. A former Malaysian foreign 
minister stated
"in our view, Japan can play a useful role 
in Southeast Asia in the political and
economic field .....  In the political
field Japan could play a useful role in 
concert with other Southeast Asian countries.
......  The need for acting in concert
with countries in the region is paramount.
At the same time it is equally important 
that Japan should accept that other countries, 
especially neighbouring medium powers such 
as India and Australia, have also a useful 
role to play in the region and should 
regard them as partners, not competitors 
in Southeast Asia."
From the earlier discussion on three regional 
issues, some features of Japan's political role in the 
region can be identified. First, Japan projects a low 
keyed political role in the region as evident by its 
participation in the Kampuchean crises. Second, Japan 
by endorsing Asean's efforts in resolving the Kampuchean
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crises, makes a political commitment to stand with the 
Asean states. However its passive involvement leaves 
Japan's declared political commitment to the Asean states 
yet to be tested. Third, Japan's involvement in 
Southeast Asia is influenced by its relationship with 
the United States. Japan's presence complements the 
United States presence vis-a-vis the Soviet presence in 
the region. However Japan is not inclined to provoke 
the Soviet Union because of fears of Soviet repercussions 
in its immediate vicinity in Northeast Asia. Japan's 
dependence on the United States security guarantee gives 
the United States the capacity to influence Japan's 
activities in the Asian region. The Asean States' are 
concerned about Unites States' influence on Japan because 
the United States could used this influence to include 
Japan in its global strategy which could result in 
insecurities in Southeast Asia. Fourth, Japan and the 
Asean states have differing perceptions concerning 
China's role in the region and Japan has attempted to 
influence the Asean states to accommodate China's 
presence in the region.
In view of differing perceptions between Japan 
and the Asean states on some significant issues discussed 
in this section and also because of the various features 
of Japan's political involvement identified above, it 
is necessary for Malaysia and the other Asean states 
to maintain their independence in addressing political 
issues. If closer ties between Malaysia and Japan will
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result in greater political influence for Japan in the 
region, this must be avoided as it will undermine the 
existing political independence of Malaysia and the 
other Asean states.
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CHAPTER THREE
MALAYSIA-JAPAN RELATIONS :
DEFENCE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Introduction
The defence policy of a state generally outlines
the strategic environment, and perceived threats to the
perceived national interest, and how these threats would
be countered. Malaysia's defence posture is limited
primarily to the defence of its territorial boundaries.'*'
2Japan currently espouses a similar defensive posture. 
Nevertheless considering Japan's widespread global 
economic interests, its perceived security needs similarily 
extend beyond its national boundaries. While Japan at 
present pursues strong economic ties and resources 
diplomacy to ensure its economic security, it was not so 
long ago that it pursued the same objectives through 
militarism. Japan's status as a global economic power, 
its vast monetary resources and technological know how 
has provoked fears of the possible revival of Japanese 
militarism among developing countries such as the Asean 
states where Japan already has a dominant economic 
influence. Repeated assurances by the Japanese leadership 
that Japan will not pursue militarism has not eliminated 
the fears of these states.
In his keynote speech to Asean in 1981, Prime 
Minister Zenko Suzuki emphasized that Japan would never
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be a major military power.
".....  we remain as firmly committed as
ever to the fundamental principle that 
our defence capability shall be an 
exclusively defensive one. This position 
is a result of our soul-searching reflection 
on the grave mistakes of the past. The 
national consensus of the Japanese people 
is that Japan shall never become a military 
power threatening other nations - and this 
consensus is unshakeable. It would, thus 
be completely mistaken either to hope that 
Japan might once again emerge as a military 
giant."3
Similarly during his Southeast Asian tour in
1983, Prime Minister Nakasone repeatedly told the Asean
leaders that Japan would adhere exclusively to a
'defensive defence', within the framework of its war-
renouncing constitution and has no intention of becoming
4a major military power. He pledged that Japan would 
maintain its three Non-Nuclear principles and that its 
military build-up would be within the framework of the
5Japan-US Security Treaty. The former foreign minister, 
Mr. Shintaro Abe, one of the three candidates most 
likely to replace Mr. Nakasone, reiterated the same 
pledge of rejecting a military role for Japan in Asia.
His policy, dubbed the 'Abe Doctrine', is one which 
endeavours to strengthen economic and political ties 
between Japan and the present Asean states.^
Does Japan's existing defence policy project 
a long-run posture that will reflect the theme repeatedly 
proclaimed by the Japanese leadership? This is an 
important issue to consider in the context of Malaysia - 
Japan bilateral relations because both Malaysia and
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Japan are concerned with the security of Southeast Asia. 
Malaysia's long-term objective for the security of 
Southeast Asia is the creation of ZOPFAN which will deny 
Japan, together with other big powers, a military presence 
in the region. This chapter will analyse Japan's defence 
policy and its implications for Malaysia and the Asean 
states generally. The focus will be on the regional 
grouping rather than Malaysia alone because that is how 
Japanese defence planners generally view the region.
The following questions will be addressed:
(1) What is the present Japanese defence policy 
in so far as it affects Southeast Asia;
(2) What is the strategic importance of Asean 
for Japan;
(3) How do the Asean countries perceive Japan; and
(4) What role does Japan have in the Asean region.
2. JAPAN'S Defence Policy
Unlike other countries, Japan has adopted a 
Constitution that places specific limitations on the 
nation's defence capabilities. Article 9 of the 
Constitution, the so called 'no war clause', renounces
7war and the maintenance of armed forces. Circumstances 
in the 1950s, however necessitated the formation of the 
'National Police Reserve', a predecessor of the Self 
Defence Forces (SDF). The primary purpose of the SDF 
is to enable Japan to exercise the right to self defence
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in accordance with the United Nations Charter. This 
limited defence capability was reinforced in 1960 by the 
Japan - US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
which committed the United States to the defence ofgJapan. On the one hand, this treaty allows Japan to
focus its resources on economic development which
hastened Japan's return to the international community.
On the other hand, it tied Japan closely to the United
States' strategy in the Far East. It has been suggested
that this collective security arrangement between the
United States and Japan serves to restrain the possible
9resurgence of militarism in Japan.
Further, Japan ratified the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty in 1976 and committed itself to 
adhere to the so-called Three Non-Nuclear Principles, 
namely: not to possess; not to manufacture; and not to 
admit nuclear weapon into the country.^ Japan has also 
until recently adhered to the policy of not exporting 
arms or military technology. In relation to this policy 
it should however be pointed out that so far there has 
been only one agreement with the United States over the 
exchange of technology. On the other hand it would 
easily be argued that many of Japan's export items are 
dual purpose exports which have military potential.
The principle of Japan's current defence 
policy was laid out in the 1976 National Programme 
Outline. Japan's basic defence policy is to possess 
capability adequate for its own defence within the
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framework of the Japan - US security arrangement. In 
the event of having to cope with aggression the outline 
stipulates that:
(1) against indirect aggression Japan 'will take 
immediate responsible action in order to 
settle the situation at an early stage';
(2) in case of limited and small-scale aggression 
Japan will repel it 'in principle without 
external assistance';
ft
(3) in cases in which aggression cannot feasibly 
be dealt with without assistance, 'Japan
will continue unyielding resistance .....
until such time as cooperation from the United 
States is introduced'; and
(4) against nuclear threat, Japan will rely on 
the nuclear deterrent capability of the 
United States.^
Japan's defence policy, as it stands, limits 
its military power to the defence of its territorial 
waters and homeland. Japan, as the second largest 
industrial and economic power, has global interests. 
However its defence policy does not enable it to project 
military power away from its immediate surroundings in 
order to secure its perceived interests in other regions, 
such as Southeast Asia, the Middle East and the Southeast 
Pacific.
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As an alternative policy, Japan has undertaken 
to contribute to the peace and stability of these regions 
by economic means; namely through trade, aid and 
investment. The Report of the Comprehensive National 
Security Study Group of 1980 has been an important 
influence on Japan's official view concerning national 
security. According to this report, Japan is liable to 
face a wide range of serious threats other than those 
in the military sphere. Thus military power is only one 
of the many components responsible for ensuring national 
security.^
Prior to considering Japan's defence policy
and its relation to the Asean states, it would be
beneficial to consider current Japanese defence issues.
In the past Japan has made two defence policy statements
which reflect different defence postures for Japan.
The Basic Policy for National Defence of 1957 identifies
Japan's defence posture as preventative and reactive in
nature. It stipulates that aggression can be repelled
13only after Japan is invaded and not before. The
current defence policy based on the National Defence
Programme Outline of 1976 states "should indirect
aggression - or any unlawful military activity which
might lead to aggression against this nation occur,
14Japan will take immediate responsive action." Then 
in 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki extended Japan's defence 
commitment to encompass 1000 nautical miles radius 
which takes Japan's defence beyond its territorial waters.
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In 1983 the current Prime Minister Mr. Nakasone
reaffirmed Japan's commitment in protecting the sea lanes
of communication and furthermore expressed bluntly that
the Japanese archipelago should become an 'unsinkable
aircraft carrier' which could defend the nation against
15Soviet Backfire Bombers. He also suggested that Japan
should acquire complete control of the straits (Straits
of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima) commanding the approach
16to Moscow's Far Eastern harbours. This trend of 
development in Japan's defence policy suggests an 
expanding forward defence role which seems to be in 
contradiction with Japan's official defensive military 
posture.
The United States under both the Carter and
Reagan administrations pressured Japan to increase its
defence expenditure beyond the self imposed '1 per cent
17of GNP' ceiling adopted in 1976. The United States 
wants Japan to move from a dependent position and take 
up a partnership role sharing the United States' burden 
for the security not just of Japan but also the region. 
In other words, the United States wants Japan to view 
its defence policy in terms of the global balance 
instead of just the limited self-defence goals admitted 
by the Japanese constitution. The recent defence budget 
for the 5 years up to 1990 allocated approximately 
$70 million, which is about 1.04 per cent of the GNP in 
that period.^ This increase was said to be necessary 
for Japan to effectively protect the sea lanes of
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communication up to the 1000 nautical miles radius
which is now its responsibility. Hence Mr. Nakasone
has succeeded in breaking the 1 per cent barrier and it
can be expected that in the future Japan's defence
spending will be 'around 1 per cent of GNP' instead of
'within 1 per cent of GNP'.
The need to revise the constitution is raised
from time to time. Since Mr. Nakasone came into office
there has been increasing attention focused on the debate
about Japan's military role and the limitation of the
'no war' Peace Constitution. Mr. Nakasone was favourably
disposed towards increasing defence outlays and the
revision of the constitution when he first took office.
He also specifically expressed the need for a new
constitution that would not be vague about Japan's right
2 0to have a military force for self defences. While a
new constitution is most unlikely to eventuate largely
because of the perceived strong domestic opposition,
new interpretations of the existing constitution seem
the next best alternative. Both Mr. Nakasone and other
government officials have given new interpretations to
Japan's self defence strategy and its relation with the
United States which has raised alarm among conservative
21Japanese politicians.
Japan has a substantial and growing capacity 
to develop and produce weapons. This capability has 
three aspects. First, weapons not developed in Japan 
but manufactured there under licence; second, weapons
12 3
and weapons related technology developed by Japanese
concerns; third, 'dual use' technology - technologies
developed and provided for civilian purposes but also
having military applications. In January 1983, Mr.
Nakasone approved, for the first time, the transfer of
military technology to the United States. The rationale
was that mutual exchange of technology was vital to the
22effective operation of the Japan - US Security Treaty.
For its part, the United States considers this as a 
means of reducing the research and development cost of 
weapons through joint development and joint production.
A possible consequence would be Japan's ability to 
develop more sophisticated weapons for itself in the 
future. Despite repeated pronouncements that Japan has 
no desire to become a great military power, it 
nevertheless has the ability to do so.
3. The Strategic Importance of Asean to Japan
Japan is the most natural-resource-poor
country among the major industrial countries. Most of
its raw materials and the fuel supplies for its
industries have to be imported. The Asean states have
become increasingly important suppliers of raw materials,
minerals and fuel supplies to Japan. The Asean states
account for 99 per cent of Japan's natural rubber and
zinc imports and also for 95 per cent of Japan's
2 3tropical lumber. In addition Japan is also heavily 
dependent on Asean for its vegetable oil, nickel, copper
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and bauxite imports. Japan's fuel oil is almost 100 per 
cent imported and the Asean share has been growing.
Since the time of the second 'oil shock' (1979-1981), 
fuel oil and liquified gas supplies from the Asean 
states, specifically Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and 
Brunei have become increasingly important to Japan.
In 1980 Asean's share of Japan's total import of crude 
oil and liquified gas was 16.8 per cent and 31.3 per 
cent respectively.^
Also since the late 1960s Japan has become the
leading investor, trading partner and aid donor to the
Asean states. Japanese interests have sought to take
advantage of the cheap labour and tax inducements
offered by the Asean government. Japanese investors
account for about 48 per cent of the total foreign
25investment in the region.
The geostrategic location of the Asean region 
is essential to Japanese security considerations.
Situated southwards from Japan, these states of Southeast 
Asia are strategically located between the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans. The Straits of Malacca and the West 
Malaysian peninsula serves as a major international 
navigation route linking the Indian Ocean with the South 
China Sea and the Pacific Ocean beyond it. The Straits 
of Malacca is considered one of the five vital 'choke 
points' for world maritime interests. Japan is heavily 
dependent on maritime transport for its supply of raw 
materials, oil supplies and also to reach its widely
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spread overseas market.
The sea lanes of communications through the 
South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca are described 
as Japan's 'life line'. It is in Japan's interest that 
oil tankers and cargo vessels operating between Japan, 
the Middle East, Africa and Australia are assured safe 
passage along the sea lanes in the South China Sea, 
the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. In May 
1981 Prime Minister Suzuki committed Japan to defend its 
vital sea lanes up to 1000 nautical miles southward from 
its coast although this 1000 nautical miles does not 
reach the 'choke points' in the Southeast Asian waters.
This commitment however, was not undertaken on Japan's 
own initiative based on assessments of the importance of 
sea lanes of communication. Japan was pressured to 
undertake this task by the Carter and Reagan administrations 
which believed it was more appropriate for Japan than
2 6United States to undertake this security responsibility.
Thus far there has been no large scale study 
by Japan to provide a strategy for defending its vital 
maritime interests in the sea lanes beyond the 1000 
nautical miles mark, southward into the South China Sea 
and the Straits of Malacca. In considering a possible 
strategy it is vital to consider the contingencies that 
could threaten and harass Japan's shipping using the 
sea lanes in the Southeast Asian region. There are 
three possible contingencies. First, internal change 
in the Asean states which could result in social and
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political change in turn resulting in hostile attitudes 
toward Japan and its interests. The second level of 
contingency is regional conflict between two or more of 
the Asean states. Such regional conflict could take 
place both on land or at sea and it could draw in the 
Superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
or a regional power particularly China. The third 
level of contingency is a global war arising from armed 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
In each of these contingencies Japan could be denied 
resources and markets. Its shipping would be open to 
harassment and disruption.
While the sea lanes through Southeast Asian 
waters and the Straits of Malacca are important, their 
significance could perhaps be exaggerated. Japanese 
ships could take alternative routes. In the event that 
only passage through the Straits of Malacca is hindered, 
ships heading to and from Japan could use the Lombak- 
Sunda, Makassar or the Ombai Straits which are all 
within Indonesian archipelagic waters. If passage is 
denied in both the Straits of Malacca and in Indonesian 
waters, shipping could be re-routed to the South of
Australia, then through the Solomon Islands and then
. T 27on to Japan.
In the event of a global war all Japan's ships 
will be vulnerable to Soviet attack in both the open 
seas and at 'choke points'. However should the Soviet 
Navy be directed to attack Japanese shipping it is
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more likely to strike near homeports and air cover than 
on sea lanes. With regard to raw material and fuel 
supplies Japan could attempt to seek out alternative 
suppliers in other parts of the world. It could also 
consider using substitutes where possible, for example 
synthetic rubber instead of natural rubber or other 
forms of energy instead of fuel oil. This would ensure 
continuous industrial operations in the event that 
passage through the Southeast Asian waters is closed 
to Japanese vessels.
4. Asean Perceptions of Japan's Defence Posture
The Asean states are not reluctant to accept 
Japanese economic aid, investment, technical know how 
and other economic involvement despite the fact that it 
could create 'dependency' instead of mutually beneficial 
'interdependent relations'. The Asean states however 
appear very hesitant about Japan's defence policy and 
acknowledge it merely out of diplomatic courtesy. As 
it stands, Japan's military capabilities are structured 
for defensive and deterrent purposes and Japan appears 
to want to continue to maintain this posture. It is 
not always possible to make a clear distinction between 
defensive and offensive weapons. Nevertheless in term 
of overall force structure, there are criteria which 
can be used. The fact that Japan does not possess 
aircraft carriers, transport and ships designed for 
military purposes, an air tanker fleet for the air-to~
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air refueling of long-range bombers or amphibious 
landing craft suggests that at present it does not seek 
an offensive force structure.
The Asean states' main concern with regard 
to Japan's defence policy is the substantial and 
continuous improvement and build-up in Japan's military 
capabilities. The primary purpose for the military 
build-up according to Japan, is to counter the increased 
Soviet build-up in the Far East. Soviet forces stationed 
on the Northern Islands (Kurile Islands) include one 
division of ground troops and MIG 25 Foxbat interceptors. 
There are also more than 40-TU-22M Backfire Strategic 
bombers, more than 30 naval aviation Backfire bombers 
equipped with long range anti-ship missiles and 
approximately 165 SS-20 missiles deployed in the Far 
East.28 The Soviet Pacific Fleet has been qualitatively 
modernized and reinforced. It now has such large-sized 
sophisticated weapons systems as the Delta 111-class 
SSBN, the kiev-class aircraft carrier, the kara-class 
missile cruiser and Ivan Gogio class amphibious assault 
ships.29 The Soviet Union has also deployed two aircraft 
carriers in the Far East, namely the Navarossiysk and 
the Minsk. The Soviets have also established a wartime 
theater level command (TVD) in the Soviet Far East.
Dibb in his assessment of the Soviet build-up in the 
Asia-Pacific region concludes that it does pose a threat 
to Japan but is not directed toward Japan as often
30proclaimed in the Japan Defence Agency's White Paper.
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The Asean states recognize the need for Japan
to increase her military capability to counter any threat
of aggression. At the same time these states fear the
revival of a militarily powerful Japan that could seek
31to establish dominance in Southeast Asia. These fears 
were revived and strongly expressed by the Asean states 
because of recent policies adopted by Japan, namely the 
extension of defence responsibility to include the sea 
lanes up to the 1000 nautical mile radius.
Indonesia and the Philippines were especially
»
apprehensive that the extended sphere would include their
territorial waters. Mr. Nakasone however gave an
assurance that this was not so and also stated that
Japan has no intention of expanding its defence
responsibility to include the Straits of Malacca in the 
32future. In contrast to the responses of Indonesia
and the Philippines, Thailand indicated that it would
33welcome a security role for Japan in the region. 
Singapore, which had in the past expressed support for 
a Japanese role in the security of the region, this
34time discouraged Japan's involvement in the region.
The Malaysian Foreign Minister, on the other hand said
Japan "should play its proper role in securing the
35safety of Southeast Asian sea lanes ..... "
The second issue is the increasing defence 
allocation in Japan's budget. Even prior to the latest 
budget allotment which exceeds the 1 per cent barrier, 
Asean states were already aware that the '1 per cent
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barrier' was insignificant because the rapid growth 
rate of Japan's GNP and the appreciation of its currency 
implies that Japan's defence spending had actually been 
increasing substantially for many years running.
Another concern among some individuals in the 
Asean states is the effect that a revision of the 
Japanese Constitution could have. The former Chief of 
the Indonesian Intelligence Board and Governor of the 
Indonesian National Defence Institute, Lieutenant- 
General Sutopo Juwano has expressed his fear that Japan 
would become a major military power if the constitution 
is revised. Ke therefore advocates the idea that the 
Japanese defence build-up should be accompanied by a
36corresponding increase in Asean military capabilities. 
Adherence to this idea would eventually result in an 
arms race in the region. Such an arms race in turn 
would threaten any possibility that ZOPFAN might become 
a reality. Malaysia is still hopeful for ZOPFAN, which 
it is confident will keep the region politically neutral 
and free from the intervention of outside powers.
5. Japan's Role in Southeast Asia
The Asean states generally accepted Japan's
Comprehensive National Security Concept which recognizes
that the sources of potential threat and instability
in Southeast Asia are not only military in nature but
37could also arise from internal domestic conflict.
Such conflicts could be caused by lack of religious and
131
political freedom, human rights issues and inequitable 
economic growth. In view of Japan's economic interests 
in the region, it would be beneficial in the long run 
if Japan could help these nations to develop politically, 
economically and socially. How about a defence role 
for Japan in the region?
At the Asean-Japan dialogue held in Kuala 
Lumpur in late August 1982, Asean delegates expressed 
concern at the prospect of a militarily aroused Japan. 
This concern was caused by Japan's increased defence 
spending and military build-up following its commitment 
‘to increase its defence responsibility to the 1000 
nautical mile mark. The Asean states' reaction is based 
on an old fear borne of the trauma of the last war.
In that war Japan's militaristic ambition was to create 
a grand economic scheme named the 'Greater East Asia 
Coprosperity Scheme' . It was designed to bring the 
resource rich countries of Southeast Asia into the 
folds of an industrial Japan. Despite its commitment 
to a pacifist policy, Japan has the capability to 
easily rearm itself and establish itself as another 
military superpower.
The Asean states are also aware of the United 
States' Asian policy aimed at having Japan share the 
security burden. Their fear is that Japan's military 
build-up is intended for a military role in the region. 
The US Defence Secretary, Casper Weinberger, took great 
pains to explain that Japan's military build-up was
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defensive - to develop its military clout so that it
could take over completely the responsibility of its
own defences which include the 1000 nautical mile
3 8defence responsibility. In considering Japan's 
military role in Southeast Asia it is also necessary to 
take into account Japanese - American military 
cooperation. Thus far Japan's economic diplomacy has 
been complemented by the US military presence to ensure 
the stability and security of the region. While the 
Asean states and Japan see the presence of the US in 
the region as a stabilizing force, the US demonstrates 
very little commitment and involvement. It has taken 
a low profile since its withdrawal from Vietnam.
The US presence is especially significant in 
view of the Soviet and Chinese presence in the region. 
The increasing Soviet military presence is perceived 
as threatening to the Asean states. The Soviet Union 
has invested heavily in building new air fields, 
improving existing ones- and enhancing port facilities 
at Cam Rhan Bay. This can be taken as an indication 
that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a permanent 
presence in the region. The Chinese presence in the 
region is also regarded with some apprehension by Asean 
members. It is feared that the presence of these two 
communist powers in the region vis-a-vis a low keyed 
US presence in the region might create an unstable 
balance of power in the region. In this context, it 
might be argued that a Japanese military role, if
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accepted by Asean states, could contribute positively
to the stability of the balance of power by supporting
the United States' military presence in the region.
However the lack of enthusiasm among Asean leaders for
a military role for Japan in the region indicates that
they perceive a Japanese military presence in the region
as 'destabilizing' rather than contributing to the
strategic balance in the region. This perception could
be based on fears that if they accept a Japanese
military role in the region the US might eventually
hand over the defence burden to Japan and withdraw from
the region. From the viewpoint of Asean states, Japan
should not be allowed to have an active and independent
military role in their region. Japan's contribution to
the defence of Southeast Asia will have to be
complemented by the presence of other powers, preferably
the United States, to act as a 'check' on any unwarranted
40Japanese military role. It is also expected that 
Japan will continue to uphold its existing defensive 
posture.
What role does Japan see for itself in 
maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia?
Japan is unlikely to project a military role because it 
realizes such a posture would displease the Asean 
nations. Furthermore its Constitution limits its 
ability to do so. For the time being Japan will 
continue to contribute to the security of this region 
by peaceful diplomacy and increased economic aid and
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economic cooperation. If however there are hostile 
elements that threaten Japanese interests in the region 
and which could in turn have detrimental effects on 
Japan's vital economic interests, Japan could feel 
forced to take a military role in the region. However 
such a role need not take the form of a dominant and 
overpowering military presence. Rather Japan could 
become more involved in the United States defence 
strategy for the region.
6. Conclusion
Japan's military posture is significant for 
Malaysia primarily because Japan has a potential capacity 
to project a military role in the region. Malaysia, 
like other Asean member states, will not accept a 
military role for Japan in the region. The present 
leadership of the country has experienced the Japanese 
Occupation during World War II and still have bitter 
memories of Japanese Occupation army and KEMPATAI 
(military police). Therefore they are still suspicious 
of a rearmed Japan.^ It can be argued that the future 
generation of leaders will not have experienced the 
Japanese Occupation and hence might be inclined to 
accept a Japanese military role in the future. This is 
very unlikely because it would be unwise to give Japan 
military influence when it already has a very firm and 
strong influence over the economy.
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Japan's concern for the peace and security of 
Southeast Asia is attributable to its economic interest 
in the region. Should Japan decide to project a military 
role in the region it will be primarily to ensure the 
peace and stability of the region and thereby ensure 
that its economic interests are secure. A Malaysian 
commentator pointed out:
"what is now necessary to emphasize in the
clearest t e r m .....  is that Japan's
political contribution to the peace, the 
stability, the independence and prosperity 
we all want cannot come out of the barrel
of the gun .....  There is ,ome ill
informed talk in Japan that tne Japanese 
can militarily contribute to the peace 
and stability of Southeast Asia."^2
This view coincides with Malaysia's policy 
which discourages external power involvement in the 
region. Malaysia, the initiator and advocate of ZOPFAN, 
still maintains this as its long-run strategy for the 
peace and security of the region.
The analysis of Japan's defence policy shows 
there are many internal constraints that have greatly 
slowed the speed of Japanese rearmament in the post war 
period. But these constraints, namely the Peace 
Constitution, Public Opinion and the Three Non Nuclear 
Principles, are not absolute. They are subject to 
interpretation and have been circumvented when deemed 
not practical or when Japan is pressured by an outside 
force, namely the United States. Japan has been able to 
develop its military capabilities significantly and 
ranks nineth in the world. Due to its defensive defence
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posture, Japan attempts to guard its perceived global 
interests through economic and political means. Japan 
is increasingly seen as a non-threat by the Asean states 
largely due to the presence of other powers in the 
region and its economic contribution to peace on security 
in the region. Nevertheless Malaysia and the other 
Asean members are aware of Japan's potential ability to 
adopt a strong military role and therefore are very 
cautious and hesitant when dealing with this aspect of 
their relations with Japan.
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CONCLUSION
In the process of reviewing the three major 
aspects of Malaysia - Japan relations it became obvious 
that the bilateral ties between these two countries has 
developed significantly over the last three decades or 
so. In addition to greater trade links, Japan has also 
diversified its economic links through investment, aid 
and technological transfer. Japan has c*so developed 
political ties with Malaysia. With regard to military 
ties, there exist no significant link between Malaysia 
and Japan because Japan has pledged that it will never 
pursue militarism in the region.
It was earlier established that the economic 
ties between Malaysia and Japan represent the major 
aspect of the bilateral relationship between these two 
states. It is said that Japan and Malaysia possess 
economies that are complementary. Japan is an advanced 
industrialized country which can offer much to Malaysia 
in terms of technology, investment and also a market for 
Malaysian goods. On the other hand, Malaysia needs 
such aid and also possess an abundance of raw material 
which are necessary for Japanese industries. In 
addition to the complementary economy, there is also 
the geographical proximity and the cultural affinity 
which should reinforce the ties between Malaysia and
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Japan. Mr. Nakasone stressed on this theme (dubbed 
'Asian idealism') during his Asean tour. Considering 
these two factors, a mutually beneficial economic ties 
between Malaysia and Japan would be expected. However 
when the economic ties between Malaysia and Japan was 
analysed, it became evident that an asymmetrical 
relationship existed.
The trade relations between Malaysia and 
Japan was initially established because of the 
complementary nature of the economies of the two 
countries. This complementary ties is now gradually 
being replaced by an increasingly competitive relation­
ship as Malaysia pursues industrialization, and this 
change is most prominent in the composition of Malaysia's 
exports to Japan. Malaysia wants to increase the 
proportion of manufactured goods and processed raw 
material exports to Japan for several reasons. These 
include to achieve a more favourable balance of trade 
with Japan and to obtain a more stable flow of foreign 
exchange earnings. Japan on the other hand uses various 
protectionist practices and policy to restrict access 
to its market. Japan being an highly industrialized 
country and economically stronger, has been able to 
impose its policies on Malaysia and therefore reap 
more benefits from the bilateral trade relationship. 
Malaysia with the weaker economy is unable to alter the 
structure of its bilateral trade ties with Japan to 
correspond to its economic objective. Subsequently
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Malaysia reaps only limited benefits from the bilateral 
trade relationship.
Japanese foreign investment in Malaysia also 
reflects an asymmetrical relation. Japan is one of 
Malaysia's major source of foreign investment. While 
to Japan, Malaysia is an insignificant investment outlet. 
Furthermore the various features of Japanese investment 
in Malaysia show that the benefits accruing to Malaysia 
from Japanese investment is not significant and in 
some instances tend to work contrary to the objectives 
of the Malaysian government. Overall Japanese investment 
activities reflect a dependency relationship which 
suggest that the distribution of benefits of Japanese 
investment in Malaysia is in Japan's favour.
Japan being a major foreign investor in 
Malaysia is also seen as a potential source of 
technology. However various indicators suggest that 
the transfer of technology by Japanese investors in 
Malaysia is less than satisfactory. This is consistent 
with the general impression that the Japanese are not 
particularly liberal in skill transfers. With regard 
to the 'Look East' policy it appears that this policy 
hinders rather than accelerate the development of the 
Malaysian economy. This perception is derived from 
the unfavourable consequences of several initiatives 
introduced to implement the 'Look East' policy.
Japan is Malaysia's major trading partner, 
an important source of investment and potential source
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of technology transfer and therefore the significance 
of this bilateral economic relation to Malaysia cannot 
be denied. However considering the asymmetrical trade 
and investment relation, the unequal distribution of 
benefits, the dependency relationship that prevail in 
the bilateral relations between Malaysia and Japan, it 
will be in Malaysia's interest to avoid closer economic 
ties which would reinforce the existing unfavourable 
relationship.
In contrast to the economic ties, the political 
ties between Malaysia and Japan is of more recent origin. 
Malaysia and Japan do not view each other as the sole 
objective of their foreign policy. Malaysia has a 
Non-aligned status and actively participates in various 
international affairs. However Malaysia's primary 
concern is the political stability of Southeast Asia, 
its immediate vicinity. Japan being an economic power 
has global economic involvement and consequently Japan 
needs to project a foreign policy that will encompass 
its global interests. In Southeast Asia, Japan has 
vital interests to safeguard and therefore it has an 
interest in maintaining political stability in the 
region. In addition to its economic interest in the 
region, Japan's political involvement in Southeast Asia 
is also influenced by its relations with the United 
States. Japan is bound to the United States by a 
mutual security treaty and other political links.
The United States has the capacity to influence Japan's
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activities in the region and this is most evident in 
the context of Superpower rivalry in Southeast Asia.
In the discussion on several regional issues 
in chapter two, Japan's and the Asean states' perceptions 
(including Malaysia's) on these issues were identified. 
Malaysia and Japan have similar perceptions on certain 
issues for example, the need for an amicable political 
solution to the Kampuchean conflict. On some other 
issues, Malaysia and Japan have differing perceptions.
For example, Japan tends to regard the Soviet Union as 
the most likely source of external threat to the region. 
Malaysia, on the other hand, views the Soviet Union as 
a distant power which does not represent an immediate 
threat to the region. Malaysia's primary concern is 
the threat from China. Japan, on the other hand, feels 
that China has a constructive role in the region.
Malaysia's long term objective for Southeast 
Asia is the creation of ZOPFAN. This will ensure 
political stability by eliminating external power 
involvement in the region. Japan holds the view that 
its political involvement in the region can make a 
positive contribution to the political stability in 
the region. Currently Japan projects a low keyed 
political role. It is possible that future developments, 
such as instability in the region or the creation of 
an organization similar to the Pacific Community 
concept could increase Japan's political role in the 
region. This will not only hinder the creation of
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ZOPFAN but it might also increase Japan's influence in 
the region and cause Malaysia and the other Asean states 
to be closely identified with Japan. This in turn will 
undermine Malaysia's credibility as a non aligned 
nation. Therefore in view of several factors just 
mentioned, namely: the United States influence on Japan; 
differing perceptions between Malaysia and Japan on 
certain regional issues, and in view of Malaysia's 
long term objective of creating ZOPFAN, it is necessary
for Malaysia to avoid closer ties which could undermine
*
its political independence when addressing political 
issues in its bilateral ties with Japan.
With regard to Japan's military posture towards 
Southeast Asia, its pledge not to pursue militarism in 
the region should not be taken for granted. Japan has 
economic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia to 
safeguard. The various constraints which has slowed 
down Japan's rearmament in the post war period are not 
absolute. These constraints, namely the Peace 
Constitution, Public Opinion in Japan and the Three Non- 
Nuclear Principles are subject to interpretation and 
can be circumvented when deemed necessary. Japan also 
has advanced and high technology industries and it also 
develops 'dual-use' technologies. Taking all this 
factors into account it becomes obvious that Japan has 
the potential capacity to build up its military 
capabilities to project a strong military role in 
Southeast Asia. Since Malaysia is not keen on a
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military role for Japan in Southeast Asia, it has to 
discourage Japan from contemplating such a role in the 
region. In view of the limited military capabilities 
of Malaysia and the other Asean states, Malaysia need 
to ensure that Japan's presence in the region is 
'checked' by the presence of other powers such as the 
United States.
Taking into account all aspects of the 
bilateral relations between Malaysia and Japan it is 
obvious that there exist no special relationship between 
Malaysia and Japan to warrant closer ties between these 
two countries. While the Malaysian Prime Minister 
might say that Japan as an economic power 'feels a sense 
of obligation to the rest of the world, especially to 
developing countries like Malaysia'.'*' There is no
2indication that Japan does indeed share this perception. 
Therefore Malaysia ties with Japan should be based on 
mutual advantage in all aspect of the bilateral 
relationship. The bilateral relationship should not 
undermine Malaysia's economic development, political 
independence and the security of its immediate vicinity 
namely Southeast Asia.
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1. Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, 'Look East' in M. Pathmanathan 
and David Lazarus eds., Wind of Change, Eastern 
Production Sdn. Bhd., Kuala Lumpur 1984, pg. 110.
2. Lim Hua Sing, Japanese perspective on Malaysia's 
'Look East' policy, Southeast Asian Affairs, 1984 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 
pg. 231.
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